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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ("U.C.A.") Section 78-2a-3 (2) (b) (i) 
(1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by 
determining that the court could review a decision of the 
Summit County Board of Adjustment (the "Board") "de novo," 
giving no deference to the Board's decision? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's 
decisions on the interpretation of law for correctness. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Park Citv 
Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 
1993); Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800 
(Utah App. 1992). 
II. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by 
determining on summary judgment that the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code did not require Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge 
project, a permitted use within the Resort Commercial Zone 
District, to submit to the formal site plan approval process 
as a prerequisite to obtaining a Building Permit? 
Standard of Review: The determination of this issue is a 
question of law in which the trial court's decision is given 
no deference, but in which the County's Board of Adjustment 
1 
decision that an approved Final Site Plan for the Red Barn 
Timberwolf Lodge project is a prerequisite for a Building 
Permit is afforded considerable deference and a statutory 
presumption of validity. This Court reviews decisions of a 
board of adjustment to determine whether the decision was 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal and based upon substantial 
evidence in the administrative record. U.C.A. 17-27-708(2) 
& (6); U.C.A. 17-27-1001(3); Patterson v. Utah County Board 
of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 - 04, 607-08 (Utah App. 
1995). 
III. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by 
determining on summary judgment that a "permitted use 
building permit" under the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code (the "Code") does not require site plan approval when 
such a "permitted use building permit" does not exist 
anywhere in the Code? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's 
interpretations of local ordinances and decisions on summary 
judgment for correctness. Webb v. Ninow, 883 P.2d 1365, 
1367 (Utah App. 1994); Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 
P.2d 797, 800 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994). 
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These issues were preserved before the trial court in the 
County's initial Memorandum of Points and Authorities, which is 
inclusive of the Administrative Record (R. 41-336; 338-60), Reply 
to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 391-400), and in both oral arguments before the 
trial court (R. 422; 426), as well as in the court's express 
rulings, reflected by Order, dated October 17, 1997, and Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated October 29, 1997. 
(R. 423-25; 427-30). 
However, this Court has stated in Patterson that it will 
"review the Board's decision as if the appeal had come directly 
from the agency." 893 P.2d at 603. Consequently, a full review 
of the Board of Adjustment's decision and record is preserved as 
a matter of law for review by this Court. (R. 41-336). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. The County Land Use Development and 
Management Act, Utah Code Ann. 17-27-701 -
708 & 1001 (1953), as amended. (Addendum A). 
2. The Snyderville Basin Development Code, 
Sections 2 (definitions), 3.6, 4.6, 4.12, & 
6.14. (Addendum B). 
3. The Snyderville Basin Administrative 
Guidelines, Resolution 93-1, Sections 7.2 & 
12.2.1. (Addendum B). 
4. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Addendum D). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a land use case in which a property owner, Red Barn 
Development ("Red Barn"), the appellee, challenged Summit 
County's interpretation of its own Development Code requiring 
Final Site Plan approval of Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge project 
prior to issuance of a Building Permit. The claim arose from the 
Summit County Director of Community Development's (the 
"Director's") attempt to enforce the permitting requirements of 
the Snyderville Basin Development Code (the "Code") precluding 
Red Barn from pulling Building Permits without Final Site Plan 
approval by the County. The Summit County Board of Adjustment 
(the "Board") upheld the Director's interpretation of the Code 
and Red Barn appealed the Board's decision to the Third District 
Court of Summit County. 
The trial court's decision in this matter was rendered in 
the context of a petition for judicial review pursuant to U.C.A. 
Sections 17-27-708 and 17-27-1001. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Red 
Barn and the County has appealed. This Court reviews the issues 
asserted herein as though the appeal came directly from the Board 
of Adjustment decision. The same issues as presented to the 
Board and trial court, therefore, are presented for this Court's 
review. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because inquiry into the specific facts presented by the Red 
Barn circumstance was not required for the County's 
interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code (the 
"Code"), which is the County's zoning ordinance for the 
Snyderville Basin, the issues in this case are questions of law 
and statutory construction related to (1) the Summit County 
Director of Community Development's (the "Director's") 
interpretation of the Code, (2) the decision by the Summit County 
Board of Adjustment (the "Board") upholding that interpretation, 
and (3) the trial court's decision to give no deference to those 
interpretations and review the Code "de novo." Therefore, by its 
very nature, the Statements of Facts to be offered by both 
parties differ somewhat in character from those which the Court 
might normally review in a typical case resolved on cross motions 
for summary judgment. 
While the parties may argue that the Court should draw 
different inferences from the facts presented, there are no 
genuine issues of fact which are material to the questions of law 
on which the trial court based its decision. Summary judgment 
is, therefore, an appropriate method of resolving the dispute; 
limiting the issues before this Court to whether the trial court 
(1) used the correct standard of legal review, and (2) reached 
the correct legal conclusions. 
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1. On September 4, 1996, Summit County Senior Planner, Leslie 
Burns, acknowledged receipt of a sketch plan for Red Barn's 
Timberwolf Lodge project (R. 480) and indicated to Red Barn that 
[p]rior to Summit County accepting, reviewing 
and issuing Building Permits for the Red Barn 
development, Red Barn must first obtain site 
plan/subdivision plat approval for the 
project. This review procedure is outlined 
in the Snyderville Basin Development Code and 
includes a Sketch Plan submittal reviewed by 
Staff, a preliminary submittal reviewed by 
Staff, Service Providers, the Planning 
Commission and Board of County Commissioners, 
and a final submittal reviewed by Staff, 
Service Providers and the Board of County 
Commissioners. Two public hearings are 
required at the preliminary stage, one with 
the Planning Commission and the other with 
the Board of County Commissioners. 
(R. 256-57; 331-32) . 
2. On March 21, 1997, Red Barn, without having first submitted a 
Preliminary Site Plan application, submitted a Final Site Plan 
application to the Summit County Department of Community 
Development. Summit County (the "County") refused to officially 
accept this application as one for Final Site Plan approval 
because Red Barn failed to follow the site plan approval process 
requiring sketch plan and preliminary site plan review prior to 
final site plan review. (R. 259-60; 329-30). 
3. On April 11, 1997, Red Barn, without any official approval 
from Summit County, declared its Final Site Plan approved and 
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requested a Building Permit to begin construction of its 
Timberwolf Lodge project. (R. 261; 328). 
4. On April 15, 1997, Doug Dotson, Summit County Director of 
Community Development, responded to Red Barn's request by denying 
issuance of a Building Permit. In his denial letter, Mr. Dotson 
explained that, in accordance with the Snyderville Basin 
Development Code, the process for approval of projects, such as 
Red Barn's, requires Preliminary and Final Site Plan approval by 
the Snyderville Basin Planning Commission and Board of County 
Commissioners. Mr. Dotson explained where in the Code these 
requirements were found. (R. 262-63; 326-27). 
5. On April 24, 1997, Red Barn appealed the Director's Building 
Permit denial to the Summit County Board of Adjustment on the 
following basis: 
Specifically, Red Barn will request that the 
Summit County Board of Adjustment determine 
that no preliminary site plan approval is 
required, that no site plan approval is 
required before the Planning Commission, and 
that building permits should be immediately 
issued based upon the application and 
requested permitted use of Red Barn 
Development. 
(R. 264-65; 324-25). 
6. On May 22, 1997 and June 19, 1997, the Board heard and 
weighed the evidence presented by both the Director and Red Barn 
concerning Red Barn's appeal of the Director's denial of a 
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Building Permit. The full administrative record, to include the 
decision and findings of the Board, is at R. 41-336. 
7. The question at issue before the Board was whether the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code required Red Barn's Timberwolf 
Lodge project to go through a site plan approval process. Red 
Barn asserted before the Board that the Code either did not 
require a site plan approval of a permitted use or, at a minimum, 
was too ambiguous to tell what the site plan requirements were 
for a permitted use project and, therefore, should have been read 
not to require site plan approval for Red Barn's Timberwolf 
Lodge. (R. 286-89; 296-303; 321-22). Conversely, the Director 
asserted before the Board that the Code was not ambiguous at all 
and that, read as a whole, the Code clearly requires site plan 
approval for Red Barn's lodge project. (R. 268-77; 279; 28 9-292; 
320-21; 304-314). 
8. The Board, at both of its hearings, devoted considerable time 
to the consideration and evaluation of the merits of the appeal.1 
The Board heard a staff report from Kevin Deis, a County planner, 
and argument from Red Barn. A number of individuals representing 
Red Barn testified and a written statement from the Director was 
presented to the Board by Mr. Deis. There was also one member of 
1
 Reflected by 24 pages of minutes and 17 Exhibits in the 
form of Codes, Briefs, Statements, and Documents. (R. 41-336). 
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the general public who testified that Red Barn's proposed site 
plan was inaccurate. (R. 268-292; 297-323). 
9. Among the most determinative evidence presented to the Board 
was the Director's June 19, 1997 Memorandum, which discussed the 
Code's site plan requirements. (R. 304-14). The Board also 
considered as relevant the comments of Board Member Perry, who 
sat on the Summit County Commission at the time of the Code's 
adoption. He stated that the clear intent of the Commission was 
for the Code to require site plan approval, even for projects 
such as Red Barn's. (R. 315-18). Especially compelling was the 
admission of Red Barn's own architect who testified 
Practically, in order to get a building 
permit, we have to prepare a site plan. All 
of the objective standards are the water, 
fire, all of those things, have to be 
reviewed in the building permit process. So, 
don't split hairs. That's all I'm saying. 
Don't split hairs to death about does the 
site plan need to be done, because clearly, 
they get done and they get approved and they 
have all of the information that we would 
have otherwise. 
(R. 287-88) . 
10. The Board decided 4-1 to uphold the Director's decision and 
made findings to substantiate its position. More specifically, 
the Board held as follows: 
Board Member Shapiro made a motion that the Board of 
Adjustment uphold the decision to deny the issuance of 
a building permit to Red Barn Development, L.C., until 
the project is reviewed and approved under the site 
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plan review process as outlined in the Development 
Code. 
Utilizing the Staff's letter of June 19, 1997, which 
outlines many of the sections, I would like to go 
through some of the highlights of that, and I would 
like to incorporate the letter of June 19, 1997, into 
our findings: 
1. Section 3.6(a)(1) reads that, even in the 
permitted use, there must be all required 
permits obtained, including at a minimum a 
development permit. A development permit is 
required here, and an approved final site 
plan must go through formal approval through 
the Board of County Commissioners. This is 
based upon the fact that the Code is 
consistent throughout where it requires a 
development permit and a final site plan 
approval. There may be some ambiguities with 
respect to that requirement, but the 
development permit process throughout is a 
consistent theme in the Code. 
2. I also do disagree with Mr. Poole when he 
said that the project's architect who, when I 
asked a question, I remember distinctly said 
that a site plan was required, and I do think 
that he is allowed to testify here, and I 
think his testimony is very relevant here 
when he stated that a site plan was required. 
He is the architect for the project. 
3. Under Section 6.14 an aipproved final site 
plan is required. A final site plan as 
determined under the Code says that a map of 
a proposed development should be filed after 
approval by the Board of County 
Commissioners. This piroject falls within the 
final site plan approval process. 
4. While there has been extensive discussions 
concerning definitions under the Code and 
discussions as to whether the Code is 
ambiguous or not, both sides agree that the 
case of Patterson vs. Utah County Board of 
Adjustment states that where there is an 
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ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion of the 
statute, it is proper to look to an entire 
act in order to discern its intent and 
meaning, which means all of the sections that 
we've looked at tonight. Even assuming that 
the Code is reasonably susceptible to 
different interpretations, after reviewing 
the arguments presented by Mr. Poole, the 
general purpose of the Code is that a 
development of this scale and magnitude is 
required to go through full site plan 
approval by the planning and County 
Commissions. 
5. For the reasons presented by Staff in its 
June 19, 1997, letter, we adopt Staff's 
letter as part of our findings. 
The motion was seconded by Board Member Scopes. . . . 
The motion passed 4 to 1, with Board Members Perry, 
Scopes, Shapiro, and Weller voting in favor of the 
motion, Board Member DeGray voting against the motion, 
and Board Member Blazzard abstaining from the vote. 
. 52-54; 315-17; Addendum B). 
The Director's memorandum, which was incorporated by 
ference into the Board's findings (Finding #5), states in 
levant part: 
Analysis Related to Site Plan Approval by the County 
Commissioners 
The Applicant contends that, since the proposed use is 
permitted in the Resort Commercial zone, it is entitled 
to a building permit without final site plan review by 
the Planning Commission and final site plan approval by 
the BCC. With regard to the Applicants position the 
Department finds the following regulations in the 
Development Code: 
1. Chapter 3, Section 3.6(a)(1) requires a 
permitted use obtain a development permit 
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prior to establishing a use. Section 
3.6 (a) (1) reads: 
. • . No permitted use shall be 
established until all required 
permits are obtained including, at 
a minimum, a development permit. 
It is clear in Section 3.6(a)(1) that the 
Applicant must obtain a development permit to 
proceed with its project. 
[A] development permit can be one of many 
types of permits or approvals listed in 
Section 2.2(43), including a building permit 
or a final site plan approval. 
Chapter 4, Section 4.12(b) of the Development 
Code and Section 12.2(1) of the 
Administrative Guidelines elaborates and, in 
fact, establishes the specific requirements 
for obtaining a building permit. Section 
4.12(b) reads: 
Building Permit Required - Any 
applicant for a building permit 
shall submit an approved final site 
plan, final subdivision plat, and, 
if applicable, a conditional use 
permit, master preliminary plat, 
specific plan or development 
agreement prior to obtaining 
issuance of a building permit. 
Section 12.2(1) reads: 
Development permit required. Any 
application for a building permit 
shall submit a minor permit or an 
approved final site plan , final 
subdivision plat, and if 
applicable, a conditional use 
permit, master preliminary plat, 
12 
specific plan or development 
agreement prior to the issuance of 
a building permit. 
5. The minutes of the May 22, 1997 Board of 
Adjustment meeting indicate that the 
Applicant agreed that a site plan was 
required. Richard Kohler, architect for the 
Applicant, stated that all information for 
site plan review was submitted to Summit 
County for review and consideration in 
conjunction with the issuance of a building 
permit. The Applicant clearly stated that 
the issue was not whether a site plan 
approval was required, but who was 
responsible for reviewing and approving the 
site plan for a permitted use. The Applicant 
contends that the Community Development 
Director can approve the final site plan in 
conjunction with the issuance of a building 
permit. However, the Development Code does 
not permit the Director to approve a final 
site plan. Section 2.2 (48) . . . Section 
2.2.(9) . . . Sections 4.6(c)(1)(a) and 
4.6(c) (2) (a) of the Code. 
7. When reviewed in this context, the 
Department's position o[n] Section 6.14 of 
the Development Code is correct. Section 
6.14 states: 
(1) The Director may authorize 
building permits for non-
residential and multi-family 
dwellings provided that a final 
site plan has been approved by the 
County and construction plans have 
been released by the County 
Engineer. (Emphasis added) 
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Analysis Related to Review Process for Site Plan 
Approval 
Once the Applicant develops a site plan in accordance 
with Section 2.2(98), it must seek approval of the site 
plan. Chapter 4, entitled "Development Application 
Procedures and Approval Processes/' and Section 7.2 of 
the Administrative Guidelines, approved by the Board of 
County Commissioners on January 12, 1993, describe in 
detail the site plan review and approval process. 
4. In accordance with Sections 4.6(b), 
4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Development Code and 
7.2(2) of the Administrative Guidelines, the 
applicant seeks approval of their site plan 
and final site plan through the 
recommendation from Planning Commission to 
the BCC. The process which the applicant is 
being required to follow has been the same 
process by which the Department has been 
reviewing similar development projects in the 
Snyderville Basin since the adoption of the 
Development Code in 1993. The Department has 
consistently brought development projects, 
which are permitted uses in their respective 
zones, before the Planning Commission and the 
BCC for preliminary site plan and final site 
plan approval prior to the issuance of 
building permits. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the above analysis of the Development Code 
and Administrative Guidelines, it is clear that there 
is a logical and understandable process with specific 
requirements the applicant needs to follow [sic] in 
order to obtain issuance of a building permit. 
Moreover, the same review and approval process has been 
applied to all other permitted uses that have been 
approved by Summit County since the adoption of the 
Development Code in January of 1993. 
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One other point should be made regarding the 
Applicant's claim. Many of the so-called permitted 
uses identified in the Development Code do create 
impacts on surrounding properties. If the approval of 
the Applicant's multi-family development were handled 
only through a building permit review process, it would 
be impossible to determine any applicable and 
reasonable concerns from surrounding property owners. 
The issuance of a building permit, for example, does 
not require a public hearing, giving property owners 
the opportunity to voice concerns. . . . The purpose is 
. . . to ensure that the use, in this case a multi-
family development, minimizes all impacts on 
surrounding properties. . . . 
I recommend the Board of Adjustment uphold the 
decision to deny the issuance of a building permit to 
Red Barn Development, L.C. until the project is 
reviewed and approved under the site plan review 
process as outlined in the Development Code. 
(R. 44-51; 307-14; Addendum B). 
11. Red Barn appealed the Board's decision to the Third District 
Court of Summit County on July 11, 1997 under U.C.A. 17-27-708 
and 17-27-1001. (R. 1-11). The County answered Red Barn's 
Complaint (R. 19-35) and both sides filed Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 36-37; 365-66). 
12. On October 17, 1997, following a September 30, 1997 hearing, 
Judge Pat Brian decided what standard of review he would apply to 
the Board's decision. The County asserted that the court's 
review was governed by U.C.A. 17-27-708(2) & (6) and 17-27-
1001(3), which defers to the decision of the Board unless that 
decision is arbitrary, capricious or illegal and not based upon 
substantial evidence in the administrative record. (R. 338-60). 
15 
Red Barn asserted that the court's review was "de novo." (R. 
369-89). Judge Brian ruled that his review of the Board's 
decision would be "de novo." (R. 423-25). 
13. On October 29, 1997, following an October 27, 1997 hearing, 
Judge Brian granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
denied Plaintiff's relief prayed for, and denied Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. In making such a ruling, Judge 
Brian provided the following reasoning: 
3. Plaintiff properly seeks a permitted use building 
permit, and not a conditional use building permit. The 
Code clearly distinguishes between a permitted use 
building permit and a conditional use building permit. 
However, this Court is not convinced that the Code 
clearly sets forth all the requirements for obtaining a 
permitted use building permit. 
4. A reading of sections 3.6 and 3.7 of the Code 
indicate that while a final site plan approval is 
required to obtain a conditional use building permit, 
the Code makes no such requirement for obtaining a 
permitted use building permit. 
5. Defendant's assertion the other elements of the 
Code taken together, or in the alternative, that the 
intent of the Code gives rise to a requiring a final 
site plan for a permitted use building permit is 
unsupported by the plain language of the Code. 
6. Consequently, this Court holds that Plaintiff need 
not submit a final Site Plan for the County's review 
and has complied with the Code's requirements set forth 
to obtain a permitted use building permit. 
(R. 429). 
14. The County appealed these decisions of the trial court on 
November 17, 1997 to this Court. (R. 431-32). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judicial review of a board of adjustment decision and a 
county's application of its own zoning ordinance carries a 
statutory presumption of validity and is afforded broad judicial 
deference. The court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the board but will limit its inquiry into whether reasonable 
minds could have reached the decision that the board rendered. 
The same deference is given to interpretations of the zoning 
ordinance by the County's zoning staff. 
An interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code 
must be conducted by evaluating all of the relevant provisions of 
the zoning ordinance and applying them in a manner which is 
internally consistent. Summit County's staff conducted this type 
of evaluation and concluded that Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge, 
located within the Resort Commercial Zone District, requires an 
approved Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a Building Permit. 
This interpretation, which was adopted by the Board of 
Adjustment, is reasonable, internally consistent and legally 
correct. 
It is important to bear in mind in this context that even if 
the ordinance in question and information presented during the 
administrative process and hearings may have also justified a 
contrary result, that does not render the decision arbitrary, 
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capricious, or illegal, or otherwise justify the court 
substituting its own judgment for that of local decision makers. 
The trial court, however, disregarded this statutory 
standard of review and instead struck out on its own accord in 
interpreting the Code "de novo," paying no deference to the 
decision of the Board of Adjustment. This improper application 
of the law was compounded when the trial court failed to follow 
the statutory rules of construction, and, in legislating from the 
bench two new development permits previously not present in the 
Code, found that Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge did not have to 
submit an approved Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a 
Building Permit. This Court, based on a correct application of 
the law to the Code and Board's decision, should reach a contrary 
conclusion than that of the trial court and reverse the trial 
court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY DETERMINING THAT THE COURT COULD 
REVIEW A DECISION OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT (THE "BOARD") "DE NOVO," GIVING 
NO DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD'S DECISION? 
The trial court determined that it "would review the Board 
of Adjustment's decision de novo, giving no deference to the 
conclusions of law reached by the Board of Adjustments." (R. 
428) . 
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A. Statutory Standard of Review. 
As a general matter, board of adjustment decisions which 
construe zoning regulations are afforded a presumption of 
validity. 
The administrative construction of the 
ordinance is formally respected by the 
courts, and the cases suggest that such 
administrative interpretation is given at 
least a presumption of validity. 
3 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 4 ed. (1996) Section 
19.12 at 379. In Utah, board of adjustment decisions are clothed 
with a statutory presumption of validity and a court's review of 
those decisions is very narrow. 
The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use 
decisions and regulations are 
valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not 
the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
U.C.A. 17-27-1001(3). See also Thurston v. Cache County, 626 
P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1981). More specifically, the County Land 
Use Development and Management Act states: 
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only 
allege that the board of adjustment's 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. . . . 
(5) (a) (i) If there is a record, the 
district court's review is limited to the 
record provided by the board of adjustment. 
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(6) The court shall affirm the decision of 
the board of adjustment if the decision is 
supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. . . . 
U.C.A. 17-27-708. See also Patterson v. Utah County Board of 
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 1995) (court should give 
"substantial deference" to board of adjustment decisions). 
Unlike other governmental administrative agency decisions 
which are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 
decisions of county administrative bodies, such as boards of 
adjustment, are not. U.C.A. 63-46b-2(l)(b). See also Tolman v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 n.3 (Utah App. 1991); 
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-07 (Utah App. 
1988). Instead the Utah State legislature has set forth a 
distinct and very limited standard of review for land use 
decisions by counties and boards of adjustment, which, unlike the 
APA, does not include any "de novo" review. U.C.A. 17-27-708(2); 
17-27-1001(3). Compare U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4)(b). The Utah Supreme 
Court has agreed, by Rule, to this standard (Rule 81(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure & Utah Constitution, Article VIII, 
Section 4), the which cannot be altered by the whims of a trial 
court judge. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 
1982) ("A statute should be applied according to its literal 
wording . . . We must assume that each term in the statute was 
used advisedly by the legislature and that each should be 
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interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted 
meaning"); Smith v. Schwartz, 60 P. 305, 308 (Utah 1899) (where 
the State legislature has provided a standard of review that is 
unambiguous, courts should not attempt to modify the standard). 
Consequently, the plain language of Utah statutory law 
clearly requires that Board decisions, even ones concerning the 
interpretation and application of zoning laws, be afforded 
"substantial deference" by the district court and judicial review 
is therefore limited to determining only whether the decision was 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal and based upon substantial 
evidence in the administrative record. 
Likewise, this Appellate Court reviews a board of adjustment 
decision as if the appeal had come directly from the board and 
applies the same standard established for the district court's 
review. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603. 
B. Case law substantiating the Statutory Standard of Review. 
When a board of adjustment's decision turns on its 
interpretation of its own zoning ordinance, that interpretation 
must be upheld unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation." Levy v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 570 
A.2d 739, 746 (D.C. App. 1990). 
Utah courts have accepted the premise that boards of 
adjustment should be given a "comparatively wide latitude of 
discretion" and that their decisions should carry a presumption 
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of correctness. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604 n.4 (citations 
omitted) . 
Accordingly, we will not substitute our 
judgment on matters of public policy normally 
left to the Board's discretion; we will 
simply ensure that the Board proceeds within 
the limits of fairness and justice and acts 
in good faith to achieve permissible ends. 
Id. at 604. See also Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake 
City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984) ("It does not lie within 
the prerogative of the . . . court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the Board . . . " ) . "[C]ourts will not consider the 
wisdom, necessity or advisability or otherwise interfere with a 
zoning determination unless it is shown that there is no 
reasonable basis to justify the action taken.11 Sandy City v. 
Salt Lake County (Sandy City I), 794 P.2d 482, 485-86, cert. 
granted 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1990). 
Even at the staff level, administrative interpretations of 
zoning ordinances are given considerable deference. In re 
Duncan, 584 A.2d 1140, 1144 (Vt. 1990) ("absent compelling 
indication of error," courts will sustain the interpretation of a 
zoning ordinance by the zoning board and staff). See also 
Appelbaum v. Deutsche 489 N.E.2d 1275, 1276 (N.Y. 1985) 
(interpretation of a zoning ordinance by the administrative 
agency responsible for administering and enforcing the ordinance 
is entitled to great weight and judicial deference). 
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It is axiomatic that a local zoning board is 
entrusted with a reasonable measure of 
discretion in the interpretation of its own 
ordinances and that the judicial function in 
reviewing a board's decision is a limited 
one. Accordingly, a board's determination 
should not be cast aside unless there is a 
showing of illegality, arbitrariness, or an 
abuse of discretion (citation omitted). 
Bockis v. Kavser, 491 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (1985). 
This philosophy is also consistent with the seminal cases in 
Utah on review of an administrative agency's interpretation of 
its own regulation. In Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing 
Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court has 
stated: 
A review of our recent cases, however, makes 
it clear that it is not the characterization 
of an issue as a mixed question of fact and 
law or the characterization of the issue as a 
question of general law that is dispositive 
of the determination of the appropriate level 
of judicial review. Rather, what has 
developed as the dispositive factor is 
whether the agency, by virtue of its 
experience or expertise, is in a better 
position than the courts to give effect to 
the regulatory object to be achieved. 
(emphasis added). 
Certainly the overwhelming Utah case authority places zoning 
boards, to include boards of adjustment, into the category of 
entities which are in a better position than the courts to give 
effect to "the regulatory object to be achieved." See Patterson, 
893 P.2d at 607-08; Cottonwood Heights Citizen's Association v. 
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Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138, 
140 (Utah 1979) . 
Consequently, it is clear that the weight of case authority 
supports the statutory standard of "substantial deference." 
C. Red Barn's argument for "de novo" review. 
At the trial court, Red Barn relied on principally five Utah 
cases which it held stood for the proposition that "de novo" 
review by a trial court of board of adjustment decisions was 
appropriate. These cases were Sandy City v. Salt Lake County 
(Sandy City II), 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992), Town of Alta v. Ben 
Hame Corporation, 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992), Stucker v. 
Summit County, 870 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1994), Beaver County v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 916 P.2d 344 (Utah 1996), and 
Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. (R. 377-78; 408). Notwithstanding 
Red Barn's interpretation, none of these cases stand for such a 
proposition. 
Sandy City II did not concern a board of adjustment 
decision, nor, for that matter, was it even a zoning case. Sandy 
City II involved annexation laws and the interpretation of the 
waiver doctrine. The board of adjustment and land use statutory 
standards of review discussed above were wholly inapplicable to 
that case.2 
2
 Sandy City I, not Sandy City II, was a zoning case. 
However, that case adhered to th€> statutory standard of review. 
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In Town of Alta, the appellate court was reviewing the 
interpretation of a zoning ordinance by a trial court judge. As 
was the case in Sandy City II, Town of Alta did not concern a 
decision of a board of adjustment,3 Given the fact that an 
appellate court stands in no better position than the trial court 
in the interpretation of County zoning laws, it was entirely 
appropriate for the Court of Appeals to review the trial judge's 
decision "de novo." However, it is quite another concept to 
disregard the statutory standard of review enacted by the State 
Legislature where the interpretation being reviewed by the court 
is from a board of adjustment or other county zoning authority. 
In those cases, the local zoning authority, who is endowed with 
specialized knowledge and skill in zoning and land use, does not 
stand in the same position as a trial judge, rather those local 
zoning authorities are in a much better position to interpret the 
local zoning laws. See generally, Patterson, 893 P.2d at 607-08; 
Morton International, Inc., 814 P.2d at 586; Cottonwood Heights 
Citizen's Association, 593 P.2d at 140. 
3
 In fact, the Town of Alta court stated, "there has been 
no official interpretation by Salt Lake County which would bind 
or influence the court's interpretation of the county 
ordinances." 836 P.2d at 800. That cannot be said in the case 
sub iudice. 
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Likewise in Stucker, the appellate court was not dealing 
with an interpretation coming from a board of adjustment. In 
fact, in that case, there was no administrative record at all 
from which a court could conduct a review of the county's land 
use decision. 
As for Beaver County, that was a tax case governed by the 
State Tax Code and the APA, not one involving land use law and 
its specific statutory standard of review found in U.C.A. 17-27-
708 Sc 1001. 
Finally, in Patterson, when the Court of Appeals considered 
the amount of discretion given to a board of adjustment in 
interpreting its own zoning code, that court concluded 
[f]rom a practical standpoint, this standard 
necessarily leaves substantial discretion to 
the Board of Adjustment. Given the Board's 
specialized knowledge in zoning matters and 
"the importance of professional expertise and 
community-wide perspective in zoning matters, 
such a grant of discretion makes good sense." 
We recognize that the Board is in a much 
better position than we are to achieve the 
desired goal of proper zoning as determined 
by the county commission. . . . 
Patterson, 893 P.2d at 607-08. Consequently, the plain language 
of that case does not lend support to Red Barn's proposition for 
"de novo" review. 
At the Board and trial court, Red Barn also has relied on 
Patterson in support of the contention that, because the 
interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code by the 
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Board was in derogation of Red Barn's property rights, any 
question in interpretation must be resolved in its favor. 893 
P.2d at 606. (R. 283; 384). This citation to Patterson is 
narrow and taken out of context. Reviewed in the proper 
perspective, the Patterson citation does not support Red Barn's 
position, for prior to and following the sentence which Red Barn 
quoted in its trial brief, the Patterson court spent four pages 
of discussion establishing "substantial deference" as the 
appropriate standard for reviewing a board of adjustment 
decision. For example, following Red Barn's quoted sentence, the 
court notes that property owners hold their property subject to 
the reasonableness of the police power by the legislative body 
and that the exercise of that police power in promoting public 
health, safety, and welfare, is afforded a presumption of 
validity. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606-07. As discussed herein, 
using a permitting system, like site plans, to implement zoning 
uses is a valid exercise of the police power. 
D. Conclusion. 
While the issue before this Court over the Board's site plan 
decision is a question of law, the standard for reviewing that 
question is not purely a "correction of error" standard. In view 
of the considerable discretion and presumption of validity 
afforded the board of adjustment, the standard is more of a 
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"reasonableness" standard absent a showing of illegality, id. at 
604. 
The trial court erroneously applied the wrong standard of 
review to evaluate the Board's decision, jettisoning the 
statutory standard found in U.C.A. 17-27-708 & 1001 and replacing 
it with a "de novo" review. It is no secret why neither the 
trial court, nor Red Barn, have ever cited to any controlling 
legal authority which would have allowed such a review -- there 
is none. 
As a rule, a court reviewing a local interpretation of a 
zoning ordinance should grant considerable deference to the local 
interpretation, reversing only if the interpretation is 
unreasonable, inconsistent with the ordinance in general, or 
clearly erroneous.4 Accordingly, in the case sub iudice, this 
Court should reverse the trial court's decision as to the 
appropriate standard of review and follow the wise guidance 
provided by the Patterson court: 
4
 See Appelbaum, 489 N.E.2d at 1276 ("great weight and 
deference" given to local agency construction of its ordinance); 
Levy, 570 A.2d at 746 (interpretation of zoning regulations by 
board of adjustment must be sustained unless plainly erroneous); 
Duncan, 584 A.2d at 1244 (interpretation upheld absent compelling 
indication of error); S&M Investment Co. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 702 F.Supp. 1471, 1473 (E.D. Cal. 1988) 
(interpretation must be "reasonable and sensible"); Miller's 
Smorgasbord v. Dep't of Transp., 590 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. 1991) 
(local interpretation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the ordinance or enabling statute). 
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We must simply determine in light of the 
evidence before the Board [of Adjustment], 
whether a reasonable mind could reach the 
same conclusion as the Board. It is not our 
prerogative to weigh the evidence anew. 
893 P.2d at 604. 
II 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY DETERMINING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT 
THE SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT CODE DID 
NOT REQUIRE RED BARN'S TIMBERWOLF LODGE 
PROJECT, A PERMITTED USE WITHIN THE RESORT 
COMMERCIAL ZONE DISTRICT, TO SUBMIT TO THE 
FORMAL SITE PLAN APPROVAL PROCESS AS A 
PREREQUISITE TO OBTAINING A BUILDING PERMIT? 
The trial court determined that the plain language of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code did not require Red Barn to 
obtain a Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a Building Permit. 
A. Rules of Statutory Construction. 
The rules of statutory construction are applied in the 
context of interpretation of county ordinances. E.g., Bennion v. 
Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah App. 1995); 
Clatsop County v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1393, 1395 (Or. 1974). Five 
rules of construction are particularly important in reviewing an 
interpretation of an ordinance. 
First, the interpretation must be based on the intent of the 
legislative body enacting the ordinance. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 
606; Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 222; Clatsop County, 526 P.2d at 
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1395. That intent must be ascertained from the plain language of 
the ordinance. E.g., Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 
1996). If the intent is not clear from the language used in the 
ordinance, the court may find its meaning in the general purpose 
of the ordinance. Town of Alta, 836 P.2d at 801. 
Second, the ordinance must be construed as a whole to give 
effect to the overall policy or general purpose which it is 
intended to promote. 
Thus, where there is an ambiguity or 
uncertainty in a portion of a statute, it is 
proper to look to an entire act in order to 
discern its meaning and intent; and if it is 
reasonably susceptible of different 
interpretations, the one should be chosen 
which best harmonizes with its general 
purpose. [citations omitted] Indeed, this 
court has previously stated that it will 
"divine the meaning of [a provision in] the 
county zoning ordinance . . . from the 
general purpose of the ordinance." 
[citations omitted] 
Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606. See also Warninster Township v. 
Kessler, 329 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. 1974) (Any interpretation of the 
ordinance should have as its objective "to construe any given 
word or phrase with due regard to its context, and to harmonize, 
if possible, the language under consideration with all other 
parts of the statute or ordinance"); Gerald v. York, 589 A.2d 
1272, 1274 (Me. 1991) (the ordinance should be construed in light 
of the objectives intended for the ordinance and its general 
structure as a whole); Clatsop County, 526 P.2d at 1395. Accord 
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Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 897 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Utah App. 
1995). "This rule is especially applicable here because we are 
interpreting a comprehensive zoning ordinance." Clatsop County, 
526 P.2d at 1395-96. 
Third, an interpretation should be avoided if it renders any 
part of the ordinance meaningless, superfluous, void or 
insignificant. Terner v. Spyco, Inc., 545 A.2d 192, 197 (N.J. 
Super. A.D. 1988); Czaikowski v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of the 
Citv of Milford, 540 A.2d 716, 718 (Conn. App. 1988). 
Fourth, as well stated by this Court in Bennion, 
to resolve conflicts in interpretation of 
statutes and ordinances, . . . 'a provision 
treating a matter specifically prevails over 
an incidental reference made thereto in a 
provision treating another issue, not because 
one provision has more force than another, 
but because the legislative mind is presumed 
to have stated its intent when it focused on 
that particular issue.' 
897 P.2d at 1235. Consequently, the more specific provisions of 
the Code control over the more general ones. 
Fifth, if a term is not defined in the ordinance, it is 
appropriate to rely on the interpretation of that term by the 
local zoning officials. Appelbaum, 489 N.E.2d at 1276. Even if 
a term is ambiguous, the zoning agency's interpretation should 
control if it is reasonable and sensible. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 
604. 
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B. Where non-residential (e.g.; commercial/ resort commercial or 
industrial purposes) and multi-family development is concerned/ 
the Snyderville Basin Development Code, taken as a whole, 
requires a Final Site Plan as a prerequisite for a Building 
Permit. 
(1) Site Plans generally. 
The famed land use expert, Daniel R. Mandelker, Stamper 
Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, summed up 
the purpose of site plans as follows: 
Site plan review is a zoning technique that 
allows municipalities to exercise control 
over the site details of a development. In 
the typical site plan review procedure, the 
applicant for an amendment, conditional use, 
variance or building permit submits a 
detailed site plan to the planning 
commission, zoning board or administrative 
staff. Approval of the site plan is required 
before development may proceed. Site plan 
review usually applies to nonresidential and 
multi-family development on individual lots. 
It is a useful supplement to subdivision 
controls, which do not usually apply to this 
type of development because it does not 
require subdivision of land. 
Mandelker, Land Use Law 4th ed., Section 6.68, pp. 279-80 (1997). 
See also Charter Twp. of Harrison v. Calisi, 329 N.W.2d 488, 491 
(Mich. App. 1982) (localities have authority to require and 
review site plans); Wesley Investment Company v. County of 
Alameda , 198 Cal. Rptr. 872, 873, 875-76 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 
1984) (allowing site development review of a permitted commercial 
use); McCrann v. Town Plan. & Zoning Commission, 282 A.2d 900 
(Conn. 1971) (noting the use of a site plan for an elderly 
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residential project); Sun Oil Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
169 A.2d 294 (Pa. 1961) (noting the use of a site plan for a 
commercial service station project). 
In the County Land Use Development and Management Act, 
U.C.A. 17-27-101 et. seg. (1953 & Supp. 1997), the Utah 
legislature set up a series of minimum permitting requirements 
for land use development. Among them are the platting 
requirement of residential subdivisions and the requisite for 
Building Permits prior to beginning construction. See U.C.A. 17-
27-801 & 805; 1002(2) (b). The legislature acknowledged, however, 
that these were minimum requirements and clearly stated that 
"counties may enact ordinances imposing stricter requirements or 
higher standards than are required by this chapter." U.C.A. 17-
27-105. This is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's ruling 
in State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980), wherein 
the Court held that where not inconsistent with the express 
language of a statute, the County may use its police powers to 
enact additional laws or regulations which bear upon the health, 
safety or general welfare of its residents. See also U.C.A. 17-
5-263 Sc 17-27-102. 
Consequently, Summit County is empowered to set up its own 
structure for implementing its zoning uses through various 
development permits, including, if it chooses, a site plan review 
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process (Final Site Plan) for non-residential (meaning, resort 
commercial) and/or multi-family development. 
(2) Summit County Site Plan requirements for Non-
residential (e.g.; commercial, resort commercial or 
industrial purposes) and Multi-Family Projects. 
The Snyderville Basin Development Code (the "Code"), Section 
3.6(a) (1), requires that all permitted uses obtain at a minimum, 
a "development permit." This provision of the Code was amended 
in 1994 from its former, 1993 language, which had required a 
"building permit" as the minimum permitting requirement. That 
very distinct amendment placed all future applicants, including 
Red Barn, on actual notice that more than a mere "building 
permit" was required for development of a permitted use. 
A development permit is defined in Code Section 2.2(43) to 
include both a Preliminary and Final Site Plan. In fact, there 
are a variety of development permits provided for, including 
Final Subdivision Plats, Building Permits, Conditional Use 
Permits, and any other action of the County having the effect of 
permitting the development of land. This would include Master 
Preliminary Plans under Section 4.9, Specific Plans under Section 
4.10, and Development Agreements under Section 4.11 of the Code. 
It is obvious why Section 3.6(a)(1) of the Code did not take the 
time to list all of the various types of development permits 
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which may be required under the Code for permitted uses -- there 
are a multitude of permits that may be required. 
Chapter 4 of the Code discusses development permits 
generally. It is uncontroverted that a Building Permit is 
required for Red Barn's project. Code, Section 4.125; U.C.A. 17-
27-1002(2)(b). Furthermore, Section 4.12, as well as Section 
12.2.1 of the Snyderville Basin Administrative Guidelines (the 
"Guidelines"), Resolution 93-1,6 specifically require, for all 
5
 Section 4.12 reads: 
(a) Applicability. No development shall occur except 
pursuant to a validly issued, unexpired and unrevoked 
building permit. 
(b) Building permit required. Any applicant for a building 
permit shall submit an approved final site plan, final 
subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a conditional use 
permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or 
development agreement prior to obtaining issuance of a 
building permit. The permittee shall proceed only in 
accordance with the approved development permit and any 
approved conditions, . . . 
(emphasis added). (Addendum B). 
Section 12.2.1 reads: 
Development permit required. Any applicant for a 
building permit shall submit a minor permit or an 
approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, and, 
if applicable, a conditional use permit, master 
preliminary plat, specific plan or development 
agreement prior to the issuance of a building permit. 
The permittee shall proceed only in accordance with the 
approved development permit (sic) and any approved 
conditions, . . . 
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development projects, either an approved Final Site Plan or Final 
Subdivision Plat prior to issuance of a Building Permit. As 
these sections point out, there may be other permits which could 
also be required prior to issuance of a Building Permit; such as 
an additional requirement of a Conditional Use Permit where a 
conditional use is involved. Consequently, notwithstanding the 
trial court's conclusion that the requirements of a Building 
Permit for a permitted use are unclear (R. 429), no matter the 
use (conditional or permitted), an applicant must always have one 
or the other of the aforementioned development permits (Site Plan 
or Subdivision Plat) prior to applying for a Building Permit.7 
A Site Plan, according to Sections 2.2 (48) & (98) and 4.6 
of the Code, as well as Section 7.2.2 of the Guidelines, requires 
a number of specific drawings and information which are 
evaluated, in accordance with the development standards of the 
Code (principally Chapter 5), by County Planning Staff who then 
take it before the planning commission for Preliminary Site Plan 
recommendation and then to the County Commission for its 
(emphasis added). (Addendum B). 
7
 As is easily ascertained from the plain language of the 
Code, the trial court's assertion that there are "conditional use 
building permits" and "permitted use building permits" is 
erroneous. (R. 429). The trial court's erroneous ruling is 
taken up in greater detail in Issue III herein. 
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approval. Various public hearings are required during this 
process. A Final Site Plan is then reviewed by Staff and 
approved by the County Commission. 
Although Code Section 4.6(a) describes some of the 
development projects which are required to obtain site plan 
approval, it does not indicate that it is an all inclusive 
listing of development projects requiring a Site Plan prior to 
issuance of a Building Permit. Instead, this Code Section is 
silent as to any requirement for Final Site Plan approvals for 
either non-residential (e.g.; commercial, resort commercial or 
industrial purposes) or multi-family projects. 
Section 6.14(a) (1), however, clearly states that Building 
Permits for non-residential (e.g.; commercial, resort commercial 
and industrial purposes) and multi-family dwellings shall not be 
issued until a Final Site Plan has been approved by the County.8 
There is no distinction in the Code between permitted or 
conditional use commercial, resort commercial, industrial or 
multi-family developments. 
8
 Section 6.14(a)(1) reads: 
(1) The Director may authorize building permits for non-
residential and multi-family dwellings provided that a 
final site plan has been approved by the County and 
construction plans have been released by the County 
Engineer. 
(emphasis added). (Addendum B). 
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C. Application of the Code to the Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge 
project using the Rules of Statutory Construction. 
Red Barn has indicated that its Timberwolf Lodge, which is 
to be located within the Resort Commercial Zone District, 
consisting of fifteen (15) lodge type buildings and fifty-seven 
(57) units, would be "rented on a nightly or periodic basis." 
(R. 10). Consequently, the Timberwolf Lodge appears to have the 
qualities of both a resort commercial use (tourist accommodations 
type service establishment for overnight lodging) and multi-
family use (3.8 units per building). See Code, Sections 2.2 (23) 
& (44); 3.1(b)(8).9 These dual qualities, however, are 
immaterial because the rules of statutory construction clearly 
indicate that the permitting requirements for a lodge project, 
like that contemplated by Red Barn, whether viewed as principally 
resort commercial or multi-family in nature, are identical and 
require a Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a Building Permit. 
9
 In its August 27, 1996 letter to the Director, Red Barn 
asserted that its intent was to "develop multi-family residential 
housing." (R. 255). Nevertheless, during the Board's hearing, 
Red Barn referred to the Timberwolf Lodge as a "resort commercial 
use" (R. 289), while planning staff referenced it as "multi-
family" (R. 277, 292, 307), although the Director did make 
mention of the project as a "commercial lodge." (R. 327). The 
Board concluded that all parties were in agreement that it was a 
"multi-family, resort commercial, lodge for overnight stay, and 
the units will be rented on a nightly basis. It was confirmed 
that they could also be used on a long-term rental basis." (R. 
282). In sum, the Board acknowledged that the project was both 
multi-family and resort commercial. 
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First, the plain language of Code Sections 3.6(a)(1), 4.12, 
and 6.14(a)(1), and the Guidelines, Section 12.2.1 indicate that 
a permitted use non-residential (e.g.; resort commercial) or 
multi-family type development requires a Final Site Plan 
(development permit) and Building Permit. The Board of 
Adjustment pointed to this plain language in its findings. (R. 
53-54; 316-17) . See Gohler, 919 P.2d at 562 (legislative intent 
ascertained from the plain language of the Code). 
Second, throughout the Code, zoning is consistently 
implemented through a series of development permits. In the case 
of a permitted use, Section 3.6(a)(1) suggests that there are a 
variety of permits which may be required (Final Site Plan, Final 
Subdivision Plat, Master Preliminary Plan, Specific Plan, and/or 
Development Agreement) ending in a Building Permit under Section 
4.12. In the case of a conditional use, Sections 3.7, 4.6, and 
4.12 require a Final Site Plan, Conditional Use Permit, and 
Building Permit. As the Board of Adjustment has stated, "the 
development permit process throughout is a consistent theme in 
the Code." (R. 53-54; 316-17). See Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606 
(choose the interpretation which best harmonizes with the general 
purpose of the Code). 
Third, there is no way to accept the trial court's 
conclusion that a lodge project (whether resort commercial or 
multi-family in nature), like Red Barn's, does not need formal 
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site plan approval, and give meaning and effect to Sections 4.12, 
6.14(a)(1), and 12.2.1 of the Code and Guidelines, as well as to 
the general purpose of the Code requiring a development permit to 
implement zoning. To read the Code as not requiring a Final Site 
Plan for a project, such as Red Barn's, negates the express 
requirements of Section 4.12, makes Section 6.14(a)(1) null and 
void, and renders the County's zoning and permitting process 
"meaningless, superfluous, void and insignificant." See Terrier, 
545 A.2d at 197; Czaikgwski, 540 A.2d at 718. On the other hand, 
one can give meaning and effect to all of the provisions of the 
Code where one accepts the County's interpretation. This is 
because Section 4.6(a) of the Code, which discusses site plans 
generally, can be read consistently with the other Code sections 
since it does not express a limitation on projects requiring site 
plan approval.10 See Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606 (read Code as a 
whole to give meaning and effect to all provisions); Warninster 
Township, 329 A.2d at 318. 
Fourth, the most specific section of the Code dealing with 
Site Plans and the type of project which Red Barn proposes, as 
noted by the Board of Adjustment, is Section 6.14(a)(1), which 
expressly requires a Final Site Plan for a "non-residential" 
10
 Red Barn has argued that a site plan is not required for 
its Timberwolf Lodge project because Section 4.6(a) is silent as 
to resort commercial and multi-family projects. 
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(e.g.; resort commercial purpose) or "multi-family" project. (R. 
53; 316). Since "the legislative mind is presumed to have stated 
its intent when it focused on that particular issue," this 
specific provision controls over the silence in Code Section 
4.6(a). Bermion, 897 P.2d at 1235. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in its interpretation of 
the Code, which clearly requires Final Site Plan approval of the 
Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge project prior to issuance of Building 
Permits. 
D. Applying the correct standard of review, this Court should 
uphold the Summit County Board of Adjustment's interpretation of 
the Code which requires Red Barn to procure a Final Site Plan 
approval from Summit County as a prerequisite for issuance of a 
Building Permit. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's "de novo" interpretation 
of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, this Court should 
apply the required statutory standard of review under U.C.A. 17-
27-708(2) 8c (6) and 17-27-1001(3), as noted in Issue I herein, 
determining only whether the Board's decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(1) The Board's decision is neither arbitrary, nor 
capricious. 
Whether the Board's decision regarding Red Barn's Timberwolf 
Lodge project is arbitrary or capricious is determined by whether 
there is substantial evidence in the record before the 
administrative body making the decision. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 
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604. See also Ziegler, 2 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and 
Planning, 4 ed., Section 42.07[l][a] (1988); U.C.A. 17-27-
708(6).1:L Substantial evidence exists when the amount and nature 
of relevant evidence is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
believe that the decision is supported. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 
604, n. 6; Clements v. Utah State Tax Commission, 893 P.2d 1078, 
1081 (Utah App. 1995). 
The record in this case contains substantial evidence that 
the Board thoughtfully considered the arguments on both sides of 
the issue and that it reached a decision, based upon the 
application of the facts to the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code and Utah state law, that a reasonable person could reach; 
namely, that the Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge project, as a 
permitted use within the Resort Commercial Zone, is required to 
obtain an approved Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a 
Building Permit. (R. 41-54; 268-92; 297-323; see also R. 55-243, 
inclusive of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, Ordinance 
282, and the Administrative Guidelines). Whether this Court or 
11
 Capriciousness, in a legal sense, generally exists when 
an entity decides differently in two or more cases on identical 
facts. E.g., Ziegler, supra. at Section 42.07[2][b]. Appellee 
has made no factual allegations which would support a claim that 
the decision being challenged is capricious. However, since Utah 
case law appears to treat arbitrary and capricious jointly for 
purposes of land use decisions, we will not rely heavily on the 
legal distinctions. 
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anyone else could have reached a different conclusion is 
irrelevant. See Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1035; Thurston, 626 P.2d at 
444-45; Sandy City I, 794 P.2d at 486; Ziegler, supra. at Section 
42.07[2][b]; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed. , Vol. 8A, 
Section 25.278 (1994). Because there is substantial evidence in 
the record supporting the findings and decision of the Board, as 
is set forth in Issue II (A - C) herein, its decision was not, as 
a matter of law, arbitrary or capricious. 
(2) The Board's decision is not illegal. 
The issue of legality turns on whether there was an express 
violation of a statutory provision, local ordinance, or 
procedural standard in the decision of the Board to uphold the 
Director's Building Permit denial. 
The record in this matter provides substantial evidence that 
the legal requirements contained within both State law and local 
ordinances were met. The Director was clearly within his legal 
authority to deny issuance of the Building Permit where Red Barn 
did not have a Final Site Plan approval and was, in fact, 
contesting that it even needed one. The Board's decision to 
uphold the Director's denial was, therefore, a reasonable 
exercise of its review powers and was not illegal.12 
12
 Red Barn has made no assertions that the procedural 
process used by the Board was in any way unfair or violative of 
due process or statutory law. 
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Ill 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY DETERMINING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT 
A "PERMITTED USE BUILDING PERMIT" UNDER THE 
SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT CODE (THE 
"CODE") DOES NOT REQUIRE SITE PLAN APPROVAL 
WHEN SUCH A "PERMITTED USE BUILDING PERMIT" 
DOES NOT EXIST ANYWHERE IN THE CODE? 
The trial court based its decision in this case on the fact 
that it was "not convinced that the Code clearly sets forth all 
the requirements for obtaining a permitted use building permit." 
(R. 429). 
The Code discusses a Building Permit in Sections 4.12, 5.17, 
and 6.14. However, nowhere in the Code does it ever discuss, 
mention or define a "permitted use building permit." That term, 
as well as the term "conditional use building permit," which the 
trial court also used, do not exist. The trial court erred not 
only in manufacturing two development permits which do not exist 
in the Snyderville Basin, but compounded the error by suggesting 
that the Code clearly distinguishes between these two fictitious 
permits. (R. 429). 
Utah courts have long viewed the zoning and police powers as 
discretionary legislative functions of local government. Gayland 
v. Salt Lake City, 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961); Phi Kappa Iota 
Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 212 P.2d 177, 179, 181-82 (Utah 
1949); Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P.2d 723, 724 (Utah 
1953). See also U.C.A. 17-27-101 et. sea. The basis for this 
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philosophy is steeped in the notion of separation of powers. 
McQuillin, supra. at Vol. 8A, Section 25.278. The trial court's 
sua sponte amending of the Snyderville Basin Development Code to 
include two additional permits is the very type of legislative 
meddling frowned upon by the Utah Supreme Court when it directed 
that its not 
for the courts to intrude into or interfere 
with the functions or the policies of other 
departments of government. Accordingly, 
where the action sought is a matter of 
discretion, the court may require the public 
body (or public official) to act, but will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the 
public body, by telling it how it must 
decide; and when it has so acted the courts 
will not interfere therewith unless the 
determination made is in violation of 
substantial rights, or is so totally 
discordant to reason and justice that its 
action must be deemed capricious and 
arbitrary. 
Wright Development, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232, 
233-34 (Utah 1980). See also Navlor v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 1966); Crestview-Holladay 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 
1976) . 
Both conditional and permitted uses must submit to the 
requirements of a Building Permit. Code, Section 4.12. As noted 
in Issue II, the requirements for issuance of a Building Permit 
for a permitted use are clearly set out in the Code. 
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The fact that the Snyderville Basin Development Code is 
voluminous and difficult technical reading are not grounds for 
disregarding the express provisions of the Code, nor 
manufacturing new requirements because the legislative policy is 
too complex. This is a prime reason why boards of adjustment, as 
the Patterson court has stated, are "in a much better position 
than we are to achieve the desired goal of proper zoning as 
determined by the county commission." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 
608. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue which the Court need address and decide is 
whether the Summit County Board of Adjustment's interpretation 
and application of its Development Code as requiring site plan 
approval for Red Barn's proposed Timberwolf Lodge is correct. 
The Board of Adjustment decision carries with it a statutory 
presumption of validity and considerable judicial deference. 
Though the issue presents a question of law, the appropriate 
standard is not a correction of error standard, but an evaluation 
of reasonableness and whether the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal. 
The Director and Board of Adjustment properly analyzed and 
applied the provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, 
in light of the various provisions providing for site plan 
approval of projects prior to issuance of a Building Permit, to 
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Red Barn's proposed Timberwolf Lodge. Their interpretation 
requiring site plan approval is reasonable, consistent with other 
provisions of the Code and not facially erroneous. 
Red Barn has failed to meet its burden of marshalling the 
evidence to overcome the deference afforded the County's decision 
or to rebut the statutory presumption of validity in favor of the 
Board of Adjustment decision. In fact, Red Barn has altogether 
disregarded the statutory standard of review in its entirety. 
Thus, Red Barn has failed to demonstrate that the County's 
application of its Code is arbitrary, capricious, illegal, or 
even unreasonable. At best, Red Barn has argued at the trial 
court that there is an alternative interpretation of the Code 
which might also be viewed as reasonable. As a result, it cannot 
be concluded that the County's interpretation is unreasonable, 
and, therefore, the trial court's decision granting Red Barn 
summary judgment must be reversed, and this Court should grant 
judgment in favor of Summit County. 
DATED this \ 7 ^ day of February, 1998. 
David L. Thomas 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
(COUNTY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT ACT, 
U.C.A. 17-27- 701 - 708 & 1001) 
rOl.'NTY \ASY) l\SE DFA'ELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT 17-27-701 
(a) conforms to all applicable health, safety, and building codes; 
(b) is capable of use as a residential facility for handicapped persons 
without structural or landscaping alterations that would change the 
structure's residential character; and 
(c) conforms to the county's criteria, adopted by ordinance, governing 
residential facilities for handicapped persons in areas zoned to permit 
exclusively single-family dwellings. 
(3) A county may, by ordinance, provide that no residential facility for 
handicapped persons be established or maintained within three- quarters mile 
of another existing residential facility for handicapped persons. 
(4) The use granted and permitted by this subsection is nontransferable and 
terminates if the structure is devoted to a use other than as a residential 
facility for handicapped persons or, if the structure fails to comply with 
applicable health, safety, and building codes. 
(5) (a) County ordinances shall prohibit discrimination against handi-
capped persons and against residential facilities for handicapped persons. 
(b) The decision of a county regarding the application for a permit by a 
residential facility for handicapped persons must be based on legitimate 
land use criteria and may not be based on the handicapping conditions of 
the facility's residents. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-604, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
1991, ch. 235, $ 85. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992 
PART 7 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
17-27-701. Board of adjustment — Appointment — Term 
— Vacancy* 
(1) In order to provide for just and fair treatment in the administration of 
local zoning ordinances, and to ensure that substantial justice is done, each 
county adopting a zoning ordinance shall appoint a board of adjustment to 
exercise the powers and duties provided in this part. 
(2) (a) The board of adjustment shall consist of five members and whatever 
alternate members that the chief executive officer considers appropriate. 
(b) The legislative body shall establish the terms for members of the 
board of adjustment by ordinance. 
(c) The chief executive officer shall appoint the members and alternate 
members with the advice and consent of the legislative body. 
(d) The chief executive officer shall appoint members of the first board 
of adjustment to terms so that the term of one member expires each year. 
(3) (a) No more than two alternate members may sit at any meeting of the 
board of adjustment at one time. 
(b) The legislative body shall make rules establishing a procedure for 
alternate members to serve in the absence of members of the board of 
adjustment. 
(4) (a) The chief executive may remove any member of the board of 
adjustment for cause if written charges are filed against the member with 
the chief executive. 
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17-27-702 an NHKS 
(h) The chief executive shall provide the member with a public hearing 
if he requests one. 
(5) (a) The chief executive officer with the advice and consent of the 
legislative body shall fill any vacancy 
(b) The person appointed shall serve for the unexpired term of the 
member or alternate member whose office is vacant. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-701, enacted by L. illative body" three times in Subsection (4), and 
1991, ch. 235, $ 86; 1992, ch. 23, § 37; 1995, deleted commas m three places 
ch . 179, 5 13. The I W)5 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amtnd deleted ' three to* before "five" in Subsection 
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the u» ( >«ta . deleted former Subsection (2)(a)(ii), re-
designation to Subsection (2)(aj and deleted lfltmg to changes in the membership of the 
"with the advice and consent of the legislative board, and made a related redesignation. 
body" before "considers." added Subsection Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
(2)(aXn\ substituted "chief executive" for "leg ^ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992 
NOTES TO DECISION'S 
Purpose. administrative agency Its evident purpose was 
Former ^ L7 '27-15, providing for a board o* to a-^ur^ the expeditious and orderly develop-
adjustment, was designed to assure speedv mem <>\ ,i community Lund v Cottonwood 
appeal to the proper tribunal of the grievance of Meadows Co 15 Utah 2d 305, 392 P.2d 40 
a part} adversely affected by a decision of an < 19b 4' 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 101A C J S Zoning and Land Plan 
ntng § 180 et seq 
17-27-702. Organization — Procedures. 
t 1) The board of adjustment shall-
(a) organize and elect a chairperson; and 
<b) adopt rules that comply with any ordinance adopted by the legisla-
tive body. 
(2) The board of adjustment shall meet at the call of the chairperson and at 
any other times that the board of adjustment determines. 
(3) The chairperson, or in the absence of the chairperson, the acting 
chairperson, may administer oaths and compel the attendance of witnesses. 
(4) iai All meetings of the board of adjustment shall comply with the 
requirements of Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings. 
(b) The board of adjustment shall: 
(i) keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each 
member upon each question, or if absent or failing to vote, indicating 
that fact; and 
(ii) keep records of its examinations and other official actions. 
<e) The board of adjustment may, but is not required to, have its 
proceedings contemporaneously transcribed by a court reporter or a tape 
recorder. 
(d) The board of adjustment shall file its records in the office of the 
board of adjustment. 
(e) All records in the office of the board of adjustment are public records. 
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(5) The concurring vote of at least three members of the board of adjustment 
is necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision, or determination of 
any administrative official or agency or to decide in favor of the appellant. 
(6) Decisions of the board of adjustment become effective at the meeting in 
which the decision is made, un]ess a different time is designated in the board's 
rules or at the time the decision is made. 
(7) The legislative body may fix per diem compensation for the members of 
the board of adjustment, based on necessary and reasonable expenses and on 
meetings actually attended. 
History: C. 1953,17-27-702, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 235, § 87; 1992, ch. 23, § 38; 1995, 
ch. 179, § 14. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted the 
language beginning "shall comply" for "shall be 
open to the public" in Subsection <4Ma). 
History: C. 1953,17-27-703, e n a c t e d by L. 
1991, ch . 235, § 88; 1992, ch . 23, § 39. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the lan-
guage "hear and decide" to the end of the 
introductory language in Subsection (1) and 
Appeals from zoning decisions. 
Illegal zoning. 
Appeals from zoning dec i s ions . 
This section places no limitations on the 
authority of the board of adjustment to hear 
appeals from zoning decisions applying a zon-
ing ordinance; thus, the board had authority to 
hear an appeal from the decision of a county 
commission applying a zoning ordinance. 
Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 267 Utah Adv. 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
rewrote Subsection (5), which formerly speci-
fied the concurring vote required for five-mem-
ber and three-member boards. 
Effective Da tes . — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
deleted it from (l)(a) through (lXc), added Sub-
section (2), and redesignated former Subsection 
(2) as (3). 
Effective Dates . — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
Illegal zoning. 
Where a city was claiming only the illegality 
of rezoning, not seeking a variance or exception 
to circumvent some unjust hardship in applica-
tion of the rezoning, the board of adjustment 
had no authority to hear the city's claims; the 
statute limits the powers of the board to hear 
only alleged errors in zoning enforcement deci-
sions. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 
212 (Utah 1992) (decided under former § 17-
27-16). 
17-27-703. Powers and duties. 
(1) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide: 
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance; 
(b) special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance; and 
(c) variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
(2) The board of adjustments may make determinations regarding the 
existence, expansion, or modification of nonconforming uses if tha t authority is 
delegated to them by the legislative body. 
(3) If authorized by the legislative body, the board of adjustment may 
interpret the zoning maps and pass upon disputed questions of lot lines, 
district boundary lines, or similar questions as they arise in the administration 
of the zoning regulations. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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17-27-704 COUNTIES 
17-27-704. Appeals. 
(1) (a) (i) The applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by 
a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may 
appeal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by alleging that 
there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination 
made by an official in the administration or interpretation of the 
zoning ordinance. 
(ii) The legislative body shall enact an ordinance establishing a 
reasonable time for appeal to the board of adjustment of decisions 
administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance. 
(b) Any officer, department, board, or bureau of a county affected by the 
grant or refusal of a building permit or by any other decisions of the 
administrative officer in the administration or interpretation of the zoning 
ordinance may appeal any decision to the board of adjustment. 
(2) The person or entity making the appeal has the burden of proving that 
an error has been made. 
(3) (a) Only decisions applying the ordinance may be appealed to the board 
of adjustment. 
(b) A person may not appeal, and the board of adjustment may not 
consider, any zoning ordinance amendments. 
(4) Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or requirements 
of the zoning ordinance. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-704, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 235, § 89; 1992, ch. 23, § 40; 1995, 
ch. 179, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the desig-
nation (i) to Subsection (1 )(a >, substituted "zon-
ing decision administering or interpreting a 
zoning ordinance may appeal that decision" for 
"zoning decision may appeal a decision" and 
"administration or interpretation" for "admin-
istration, interpretation or enforcement"; 
added Subsection (lHa.-di), in Subsection (l)<b; 
substituted "the administrative officer in the 
AN \: ^sis 
Appeal from decision of county commission. 
Appeal to county commission 
Appeal from decision of county commis-
sion. 
The provision of this section referring to the 
authority of the board of adjustment to hear 
appeals from decisions "made by an official" did 
not apply to prevent the board from hearing an 
appeal from the decision of a county commis-
sion; the applicable provision. § 17-27-703, 
places no limitations on the authority of the 
board of adjustment to hear appeals from zon-
ing decision applying the zoning ordinance. 
administration or interpretation" for "the zon-
ing administrator in the enforcement and ad-
ministration"; in Subsection (3)(b) substituted 
"any zoning ordinance amendments" for "any-
legislative zoning decisions"; and deleted com-
mas. 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
deleted "zoning" before "decisions" in Subsec-
tions (lKaKii and '3 ia5 and substituted wboard 
of adjustment" for "board" in Subsection 
(l'KaKii). 
Effective Dates . - Laws 1991, ch 235, 
§ 110 make- the act effective on July 1, 1992 
Bennion v Sundance Dev Corp., 267 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "> 
Appeal to county commiss ion. 
The board of adjustments is constituted by 
statute a forum for review of all administrative 
zoning decisions, but nowhere is it made the 
exclusive repository of appellate powers; the 
county commission has authority to place the 
power to issue special exceptions to general 
ordinances in the planning commission, and to 
create a right of appeal directly to the county 
commission itself Thurston v. Cache County, 
626 P.2d 440 'Utah 1981)(decided under former 
chapterj. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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17-27-705. Routine and uncontested mat ters . 
i l ) (a) With the consent of the legislative body, the chief executive officer 
may appoint an administrative officer to decide routine and uncontested 
matters before the board of adjustment. 
(b) The board of adjustment shall: 
(i) designate which matters may be decided by the administrative 
officer; and 
(ii) establish guidelines for the administrative officer to comply 
with in making decisions. 
(2) Any person affected by a decision of the hearing officer may appeal the 
decision to the board of adjustment as provided in this part. 
History: C. 1953,17-27-705, e n a c t e d by L. 
1991, ch. 235, § 90; 1992, ch. 23, § 41. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, rewrote the subject 
in Subsection (1), which formerly read "The 
chief executive officer, with the consent of the 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability. 
Grounds. 
Power to issue. 
Applicability. 
The board's decision to grant a special ex-
emption to two couples to build and operate an 
airstrip for their private use within a few miles 
of a private commercial airport was supported 
by substantial evidence; none of the board's 
required findings was shown to be arbitrary or 
capricious, and the decision violated no provi-
sion of Jaw Patterson v. Utah County Bd of 
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App 1995). 
Grounds. 
A proposed special exception will "promote 
legislative body"; substituted "administrative 
officer" for "hearing officer" in three places; and 
made related stylistic changes. 
Effective Da te s . — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
$ 310 make? the act effective on July 1, 1992 
the public health, safety and welfare" if grant-
ing the exception will contribute to the orderly 
development of the county as a whole 
Patterson v Utah Countv Bd of Adjustment, 
893 P2d 602 'Utah Ct App 1995) 
P o w e r to i ssue . 
Former section authorized, but did not re-
quire, the county commission to invest the 
board of adjustment with the power to issue 
special exceptions UJ general ordinances; how-
ever, county commission had authority to place 
the power to issue special exceptions in tin 
planning commission, and to create a right of 
appeal directly to the county commission itself 
Thurston v Cache County, 626 P2d 440 (Utah 
198U 
17-27-706. Special exceptions. 
(1) In enacting the zoning ordinance, the legislative body may: 
(a) provide for special exceptions: and 
(b) grant jurisdiction to the board of adjustment to hear and decide 
some or all special exceptions. 
(2) The board of adjustment may hear and decide special exceptions only if 
authorized to do so by the zoning ordinance and based only on the standards 
contained in the zoning ordinance. 
(3) The legislative body may provide that conditional use permits be treated 
as special exceptions in the zoning ordinance 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-706, e n a c t e d by L. Effective Da tes . — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
1991, ch . 235, § 9 1 . § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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17-27-707. Variances. 
(1) Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of the require-
ments of the zoning ordinance as applied to a parcel of property that he owns, 
leases, or in which he holds some other beneficial interest may apply to the 
board of adjustment for a variance from the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
(2) (a) The board of adjustment may grant a variance only if: 
(i) literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause an 
unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not necessary to carry 
out the general purpose of the zoning ordinance; 
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the property that do 
not generally apply to other properties in the same district; 
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a 
substantial property right possessed by other property in the same 
district; 
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and 
will not be contrary to the public interest; and 
(v) the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and substantial 
justice done. 
(b) (i) In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning ordi-
nance would cause unreasonable hardship under Subsection (2Xa), 
the board of adjustment may not find an unreasonable hardship 
unless the alleged hardship: 
(A) is located on or associated with the property for which the 
variance is sought; and 
(B) comes from circumstances peculiar to the property, not 
from conditions that are general to the neighborhood. 
(ii) In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning 
ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under Subsection 
(2)(a), the board of adjustment may not find an unreasonable hardship 
if the hardship is self-imposed or economic. 
(c) In determining whether or not there are special circumstances 
attached to the property under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment 
may find that special circumstances exist only if the special circumstances: 
(i) relate to the hardship complained of; and 
(ii) deprive the property of privileges granted to other properties in 
the same district. 
(3) The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of the conditions 
justifying a variance have been met. 
(4) Variances run with the land. 
(5) The board of adjustment and any other body may not grant use 
variances. 
(6) In granting a variance, the board of adjustment may impose additional 
requirements on the applicant that will: 
(a) mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or 
(b) serve the purpose of the standard or requirement that is waived or 
modified. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-707, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1992, m Subsection 
1991, ch. 235, § 92; 1992, ch. 23, § 42; 1995, (2KbKi> substituted "Subsection (2)(aV' for 
ch . 179, § 16. "Subsection (a)," added the phrase "the alleged 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- hardship" at the end of the subsection, and 
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deleted it from (2KbHiKA) and (2)(b)(i)(B). from the beginning of Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, Effective D a t e s . — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
deleted "Except as provided in Subsection (3)" § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R, — Construction and application of Comprehensive plan, requirement that zon-
statute or ordinance requiring notice as prereq- ing variances or exceptions be made in accor-
uisite to granting variance or exception to zon- dance with, 40 A.L.R.3d 372. 
ing requirement, 38 A.L.R.3d 167. 
17-27-708. District court review of board of adjustment 
decision, 
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board of adjustment 
may petition the district court for a review of the decision. 
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the board of adjust-
ment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(3) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the board of 
adjustment's decision is final. 
(4) (a) The board of adjustment shall transmit to the reviewing court the 
record of its proceedings including its minutes, findings, orders and, if 
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape 
recording is a true and correct transcript for purposes of this subsection. 
(5) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the 
record provided by the board of adjustment. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the 
board of adjustment's record unless that evidence was offered to the 
board of adjustment and the court determines that it was improperly 
excluded by the board of adjustment. 
(b; If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of adjustment if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
(7) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the board of 
adjustment. 
(b) (i) Before filing the petition, the aggrieved party may petition the 
board of adjustment to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the board of adjustment may 
order its decision stayed pending district court review if the board of 
adjustment finds it to be in the best interest of the county. 
(Hi) After the petition is filed the petitioner may seek an injunction 
staying the board of adjustment's decision. 
His tory : C. 1953, 17-27-708, e n a c t e d by L. Effective D a t e s . — Laws 1991, ch 235, 
1991, ch . 235, § 93. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
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NOTKSTO DECISIONS 
A'. \i >SJN stantial evidence in the record"; together, these 
concepts mean that the board's decision can 
Discretion of board only be considered arbitrary or capricious if not 
Cited supported by substantial evidence Patterson v 
. . . , . , , , I ' tah County Bd of Adjustment, 893 P2d 602 
Discretion of board.
 / I T . . , „ 4 K
J
 m n C l ^ 
™. . , n i r i
 t L A . (Utah ( t App 1995) 
The board will be found to have exercised its r r 
discretion within the proper boundaries unless Cited in Ludlow v Salt Lake County Bd of 
its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal Adjustment, 893 P2d 1101 (Utah Ct App 
and, further, "ftlhe court shall affirm the sub- 1995» 
PART 8 
SUBDIVISIONS 
17-27-801. Enactment of subdivision ordinance. 
The legislative body of any county may enact a subdivision ordinance 
requiring that a subdivision plat comply with the provisions of the subdivision 
ordinance and be approved as required by this part before: 
(1) it may be filed or recorded in the county recorder's office; and 
(2) lots may be sold. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-801, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch 235, 
1991, ch. 235, § 94. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1. 1992 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Failure of Subdi- C.J.S. — 26 C J S. Dedication § 22 
vision Control in the Western United States A A.L.R. — Broker's liability for fraud or mis-
Bluepnnt for Local Government Action, 1988 representation concerning development or non-
Utah L Rev 569. development of nearby property, 71 A L R 4th 
Preserving Utah's Open Spaces, 1973 Utah 511 
L Rev 164 Kev N u m b e r s . — Dedication ®=> 19(2 > 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am Jur 2d Dedication 
§§ 29 to 33; 83 Am Jur 2d Zoning and Plan-
ning § 518 et seq 
17-27-802. Preparat ion — Adoption. 
{D The planning commission shall: 
(a) prepare and recommend a proposed subdivision ordinance to the 
legislative body that regulates the subdivision of land in the county; 
(b) hold a public hearing on the proposed subdivision ordinance before 
making its final recommendation to the legislative body; and 
(O provide reasonable notice of the public hearing at least 14 days 
before the date of the hearing. 
(2) The legislative body shall: 
(a) hold a public hearing on the proposed subdivision ordinance recom-
mended to it by the planning commission; and 
(b) provide reasonable notice of the public hearing at least 14 days 
before the date of the hearing. 
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may: 
(a) adopt the subdivision ordinance as proposed; 
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APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT 
17-27-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use derisions 
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this 
chapter until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-1001, e n a c t e d by ment. effective April 29. 1996. Mibstitired "that 
L. 1991, ch. 235, $ 106; 1996, ch. 79, * 20. pei-on ha- exhausted all" for ' the \ ]^A\>O ex-
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1996 amend- haunted their" in Subjection 1 ' 
CHAPTER 27a 
CREATING NEW TOWNSHIPS 
[REPEALED] 
17-27a-101 to 17-27a-105. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1997, ch. 389, § 57 repeals township and a township planning ai d zoning 
^ 17-27a-101 to 17-27a-105, as enacted b\ board, effective May 5. 1997. For related provi-
Lawv 1996. ch. 308, $§ 8 to 12, providing for ^on*, -ee ^ 17-27-200 5 to 17-27-206 
election** and petitions for the creation of a 
CHAPTER 28 
FIREMEN'S CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION 
Section 
17-28-5 Appointment of county fire de-
partment personnel — Volun-
teers. 
17-28-5. Appointment of county fire depar tment person-
nel — Volunteers. 
(\) (a) Except for the chief and deputy chief of a county fire department, all 
firefighter positions in county fire departments shall be filled by persons 
appointed from a certified county fire civil service register. 
(b) County fire civil service registers for employment and promotion 
shall be prepared by the County Fire Civil Service executive director 
according to the requirements of this chapter and civil service rules. 
ADDENDUM B 
(RELEVANT PARTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD, 
INCLUSIVE OF THE SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT 
CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES) 
April 15, 1997 
Dennis K. Poole 
Dennis K. Poole & Associates, P.C 
4543 South 700 East 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
RE: Red Barn Development 
Application for Building Permits 
Dear Mr. Poole: 
The deputy county attorney, Mr. David Thomas, has forwarded to me your letters of March 
21 and April 11 and asked that I respond to your inquiries concerning your client's 
application for development and issuance of building permits. 
The Snyderville Basin Development Code (the "Code") provides that "[n]o development shall 
occur except pursuant to a validly issued, unexpired and unrevoked building permit." Code, 
Section 4 12(a) The Code goes on to state that "[a]ny applicant for a building permit shall 
submit an approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, . . . prior to obtaining issuance of 
a building permit " Code, Section 4.12(b) (emphasis added) This is consistent with Section 
5.17 of the Code where it discusses "Building Permits and Codes,'* as well as Sections 
2.2(43) & (98), 3 6(a)(1) and 4 1 which discuss the necessity of a development permit, such 
as a site plan approval, prior to development 
Your client's project for a commercial lodge requires site plan approval. As Section 
6 14(a)(1) of the Code plainly states, 
The Director may authon/e building permits tor non icsidential and multi-
family dwellings provided that a final site plan has been approved by the 
County and construction plans have been released by the County Engineei 
In order to obtain a final site plan approval, Section 4 6(c) o( the Code requires the filing 
and appioval of a preliminary sue plan This process is explained in more detail in Chapter 
7 ot the Administrative Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), Summit County Resolution 93 1, 
VJIILII was uieorpoiated by leferenuc into the Code Section 4 2(b)(1) Approval ol 
pielimmaiy site plans is tluoui'h the Snyderville Basin Planning Commission to the Boaid of 
Count) Commissioner Section I 9(a)(4) & (b)92)(e), Guidelines, Chapter 7 
( » . < 
Further, the Director of Community Development retains the option of requiring a sketch 
plan for review prior to consideration of any site plan. Code, Sections 2.2(99) & 4.3; 
Guidelines, Chapter 6. 
Consequently, I have chosen to consider your client's March 21 application as one for 
preliminary site plan approval. As such, your request for issuance of building permits is 
denied. 
Obviously, your letters indicate some confusion over the time table for approvals. The ten 
day time period noted in your March 21 letter refers to Sketch Plans, not major development 
applications such as your clients. Furthermore, as the time table schedule at Section 4.4.3 of 
the Guidelines specifically indicates, "said time limits are directory only and only the 
mandatory provisions of state statutes shall govern processing . . . ". Section 4.4.1.2. See 
also Guidelines, para. 2. As such, the time table is advisory only. No where in either the 
Code or Guidelines is there any provision that failure to comply with the time table results in 
automatic development approvals. 
If your client disagrees with my decision as to the project, you may appeal my decision to 
the Summit County Board of Adjustment in accordance with Section 1.9(e)(2)[a][l] of the 
Code and Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-27-704(1). See also Merrihew v. Salt Lake 
County Planning and Zoning Commission, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983). 
Please inform me, as soon as is practicable, of your client's decision to either appeal my 
zoning decision to the Board of Adjustment or to proceed with preliminary site plan 
approval. In the event the former is chosen, all processing of the preliminary site plan will 
cease until resolution of the dispute. 
Sincerely, 
iJouAljtihJ 
Doug Dotson 
Director, Community Development 
cc: David Thomas, Deputy County Attorney 
(JO ^ 
MINUTES 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
SPECIAL MEETING 
THURSDAY/ JUNE 19, 1997 
DISTRICT COURTROOM, COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
COALVILLE^ UTAH 
The Special Meeting of the Summit county Board of Adjustment was 
called to order Thursday, June 19, 1997, at 7:05 p.m. 
PRESENTS Jonathan DeGray—chairman, John Blazzard, Ron Perry, 
Lannie Scopes, Bruce Shapiro, Jared Weller 
STAFF PRESENT; Dave Thomas—Deputy County Attorney, Kevin Deis-
County Planner, Karen McLaws—Secretary 
REGULAR ITEMS 
l• Appeal of Administrative Decision, Red Barn Development, 
Dennis Poole 
Chair DeGray reported that John Blazzard and Jared Weller 
did not attend the previous meeting where this matter was 
discussed, but they have had an opportunity to review all of 
the information. Deputy County Attorney Dave Thomas 
explained that the By-laws state that, If they have become 
familiar with the subject matter by reading all of the 
minutes and all the submittals from all of the parties, they 
can participate in the process. They must make a 
declaration on the record that they have done so, John 
Blazzard reported that he had read all the information 
provided. He further stated that he wished to step down and 
allow Alternate Board Member scopes to vote in his place if 
Board Member Perry arrives as Alternate Board Member scopes 
attended the previous meeting. Board Member Jared Weller 
stated that he had read the information provided. 
Chair DeGray read the overview and background submitted by 
Staff at the previous meeting-
Planner Deis reported that Mr. Poole has submitted his 
summary of arguments, and he distributed copies of Staff's 
summary of arguments to the Board Members. Mr. Thomas 
explained that the Board Members should fully read both 
submissions fully before entering into deliberation. The 
Board Members read the summations. 
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Chair DeGray reported that Board Member Fon Perry had 
arrived, and Board Member Blazzard has agreed to be present 
for the discussion but abstain from voting in order to allow 
the alternate, Lannie Scopes, who attended the last meeting, 
to vote on the matter. 
John Blazzard made a motion that he abstain from voting 
so that Lannie Scopes could continue with the 
discussion and vote on this issue based on the fact 
that he was in attendance at the previous meeting in 
which this matter was discussed. Ron Perry seconded 
the motion which passed S to 0, with Lannie Scopes, the 
alternate member of the Board, abstaining from the 
vote. 
Board Member Shapiro discussed the building permit process 
and the requirement for a site plan and noted that Staff's 
presentation indicates that the difference between a single-
family dwelling obtaining a building permit and a project of 
this type is that a single-family dwelling has already gone 
through a full plat approval process which requires a site 
plan and development approval which eventually goes to the 
Board of County Commissioners• He asked for Mr. Poole's 
response to that argument. Mr. Poole felt that it applied 
to many single-family applications, but not all of them. 
Some parcels do not fit a prior approved subdivision, and 
they would go through an application process requiring 
filing of a subdivision or preliminary plat. He gave an 
example of a farmer building a barn not needing a site plan. 
Board Member Shapiro noted that appcoval of single-family 
dwellings outside subdivisions is handled through a minor 
permit process. Planner Deis explained that with a lot 
larger than 40 acres, a minor permit is required. A lot 
smaller than 40 acres that does not meet the zoning criteria 
of the area requires a minor permit and a site plan. He 
explained the minor permit review process. 
Mr. Poole maintained that the criteria involved in the 
conditional use permit process are not necessary for a 
permitted use. He felt that the conclusion reached in 
requiring that review was based on Chapter 4, and he felt 
the language in 5.17 should be relied upon, He did not feel 
that Chapter 4 applied to the application because it is not 
a subdivision and because it is a permitted use. He took 
issue with the statement in the County's submittal that the 
applicant conceded that a final plat was necessary. Mr. 
Kohler may have said something to that effect, but Mr. Poole 
2 
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stated that Mr. Kohler was not the spokesperson for Red 
Barn. Mr. Poole stated that he was the spokesperson, and he 
did not concede that point. He contended that the applicant 
is not required to go through a rezone, nor do a 
subdivision, nor have a conditional use permit, nor have a 
development agreement, nor have a site plan. 
Chair DeGray stated that, in reviewing the- Code, he asked 
himself where the applicant is directed to submit a site 
plan or commence the site plan review process for a 
permitted use. It first seemed straightforward that a site 
plan was not needed, but the further he read, the murkier 
the issue became by the time he read Section 4.12. Planner 
Deis explained that Section 4.12 states that an approved 
final site plan is required. Chair DeGray felt that, if you 
read Chapter 4 and found that your particular development 
did not fall within the procedures outlined, you would not 
go to Section 4.12 but would go to Chapter 5. Planner Deis 
explained that, if there is an ambiguity, it is proper to 
look at the entire act to discern its meaning and intent. 
If it is reasonably susceptible of different 
interpretations, the one should be chosen which best 
harmonizes with the general purpose- You would look at the 
entire Code, not just one specific statement in the Code. 
Mr. Poole noted that there is another rule of reason for 
interpreting codes, and typically, the more specific 
language controls the more general. If you interpret the 
Code to make it harmonize, you cannot exclude Section 5 and 
you cannot exclude the language of Section 3.6. That must 
be interpreted in the concept of what is a permitted use. 
Planner Deis noted that Section 4.12 also indicates that a 
building permit is required, and Chapter 5 indicates what is 
required to obtain the permit. Chair DeGray asked about 
Section 6.14, and Mr. Poole felt that did not apply because 
a public improvement required by the plat or site plan was 
not involved. Planner Deis explained that, for an applicant 
to get from the road to his property, the right-of-way must 
be crossed, requiring an encroachment permit, which would be 
a public improvement. 
Board Member Shapiro stated that everything he saw indicated 
that a site plan was required. 
Board Member Scopes discussed the fact that August 27 was 
the applicant's first correspondence to Director Dotson, and 
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in that letter the applicant stated what they wanted to do. 
Director Dotson's response on September 4 specifically 
stated that the applicant was not aware of the process and 
that building permits could not be obtained prior to plat 
approval. It also stated that the County would not accept 
building permit applications for development projects which 
did not have approved development permits. On March 21 the 
applicant responded that they were submitting final site 
plan approval. They then sent another lettez- stating that, 
since they had not received a response from Director Dotson, 
they assumed that the project was approved- The applicant 
then received a letter stating that the project was not 
approved and reiterating the Code. The letter of September 
4 stated that the applicant must have an approved 
development permit, and the last letter stated that they 
must have preliminary site plan approval. He questioned 
whether the request in the September 4 letter for final site 
plan approval was met, 
Mr. Poole responded that they did not agree with the process 
when they received the September 4 letter. They eLected to 
prepare a final site plan approval because they did not want 
to leave any question about their compliance with all the 
regulations. They did not concede that they had to do it; 
they only did it to accommodate the process and get the 
application approved. The applicant sent the second letter 
shortly thereafter because Section 4.4.3 requires thar. the 
Director respond within 10 days. Section 4.4,3 addresses 
use by right, which indicates no participation by the 
Planning Commission, County Commission, or Board of 
Adjustment, and he claimed they were entitled to the us*.. 
Planner Deis explained that they were moving from the point 
where the applicant submitted a sketch plan to a building 
permit, and the Staff argues that aLl the other steps ha^e 
to be met before you can get to the building permit. 
Board Member scopes clarified that the applicant cannot 
apply for a building permit until hs> goes through site plan 
and final site plan approval by the Planning Commission and 
Board of County Commissioners- Planner Deis explained that 
the County will not accept building permit applications for 
development projects which do not have approved development 
permits. An approved development permit includes site plan, 
final site plan, preliminary plat, etc. 
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Chair DeGray felt that the question was whether the Code 
enforces the Director's ability to jtake the decision to 
require a permitted use to go through the process. He noted 
that site plan would be reviewed at Staff level for any 
other project for compliance with the Code. They must 
decide whether the appropiiate authority is granted for this 
particular use not to go through the site planning process* 
The question before this body is whether there is a problem 
with the Code and whether there is sufficient information in 
the Code for a reasonable person to determine what is 
required. 
Board Member Blazzard asked if the Code states that when 
multiple units are placed on a parcel of land it constitutes 
a subdivision. Planner Deis explained that, because the 
developer would be siting the buildings on the parcel, they 
would be subdividing it. Since the code was adopted, other 
hotels have been reviewed and required to go to the Planning 
Commission and Board of County commissioners. 
Vince Desimone, representing Shepherd of the Mountains 
Lutheran Church, requested that the public hearing be re-
opened. He felt the applicant was Inaccurate as to where 
buildings would be placed on the site and that the planning 
process should be followed so information could be developed 
to allow them to take a position as to how this project is 
compatible with public interest. H»2 asked that the Board of 
Adjustment make a decision that win allow the public to 
participate in the planning process. He also noted that 
this decision would set a precedent for other land in the 
Wolf Mountain area. 
Board Member Blazzard questioned the rationale that, since 
this is a permitted use, the developer could get a building 
permit without site plan approval, and he asked who would 
determine where the building and the development of the 
piece of property would take place* It was noted that it 
would go back to Planning Staff for review and there would 
be no public review process. 
Mr. Poole stated that the only thing staff could interpret 
is whether the permitted use complies with the requirements 
of the zone. If it goes to the Planning Commission or Board 
of County Commissioners, there would be nothing they could 
request that the applicant: change. If the criteria are met, 
it is not a conditional use, and they could not impose any 
other restrictions because they are not provided by Code. 
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Board Member Shapiro responded that they could impose 
conditions on where the parking is located, where the 
screening is located, the signage, etc. Planner Deis 
explained that all the service providers must also provide 
approval. Chair DeGray agreed with Staff that a project of 
this size should go through a Planning Commission review 
with public input because of its impact. 
Board Member Perry expressed concern about receiving 
information pertaining to this decision only a few hours 
before the meeting. He explained that his intent as a 
County Commissioner when the Code was adopted was that the 
purpose of permitted uses was to specify areas in the County 
for various types of development. it was not intended to 
abrogate the process of site approval for density, stream 
alteration, ridgeline protection, wetlands, and other 
issues. He felt that trying to glean out parts of the Code 
to fit a process that the applicant may or may not want to 
follow would abrogate the process. He did not feel that the 
intent of the County Commission was to avoid a development 
processf even in the permitted use. 
Board Member Scopes stated that he did not see any ambiguity 
in the Code relative to Staff's recommendation. 
John Blazzard stated that it appeared that the process had 
been conducted this way since 1993, and everyone else who 
has been involved in developing was required to go through 
the process. It appeared that there had been many people 
who had understood the Code and the process, and he was 
concerned about circumventing the opportunity for public 
input. 
Board Member Jared Weller discussed the fact that a 
precedent could be set. Precedents have been set at times, 
and they have regretted them, and he felt that the process 
with the Planning Commission must be followed to make the 
process viable for everyone. He felt the planning process 
was good for the community. 
Board Member Shapiro noted that, consistently throughout the 
Ordinance, there are requirements for development permits. 
He could not imagine that the County Commission's intent was 
that a project of this magnitude would not go through the 
formal approval process with the Planning Commission and the 
Board of County Commissioners. He felt that 
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circumnavigating that process would circumnavigate the 
intent of the statute as a whole. 
Chair DeGray felt there were some problems with the Code 
which made it hard to follow and read. He felt that a 
project of this magnitude should be reviewed through the 
Planning commission level with public input- Looking at 
what the Code provides for this project, according to 
Sections 3.5 and 3,6, it is a permitted use. He had a 
difficult time supporting Staff's request to uphold the 
Director's decision because he did not believe the Code was 
clear enough. He felt there was enough ambiguity that he 
would side with the property owner. 
Board Member Perry noted that the staff indicated that there 
have been other applicants with permitted uses who have been 
through the approval process, but apparently this applicant 
disagrees, so he may find ambiguity in the Code. The 
applicant has presented some good arguments, but Board 
Member Perry felt there was enough evidence in the intent of 
the Code and its provisions to uphold staff's position. 
Chair DeGray clarified that, even as a permitted use, the 
application would go through Staff review which could be a 
high level of scrutiny. He questioned whether there was 
enough information in the Code to push it to the level of 
Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners 
review. 
Board Member Shapiro made a motion that the Board of 
Adjustment uphold the decision to deny the issuance of 
a fcuilding permit to Red Barn Development/ L.C., until 
the project is reviewed and approved under the site 
plan review process as outlined in the Development 
code. 
Utilizing the staff's letter of June 19, 1997, which 
outlines many of the sections, X would liKe to go 
through some of the highlights of that, and I would 
like to incorporate the letter of Juno 19, 1997, into 
our findings; 
1. Section 3.6(a)(1) reads that, even in the 
permitted use, there must be all required permits 
obtained, including at a minimum a development 
permit* A development permit is required here, 
and an approved final site plan must go through 
; 
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formal approval through the Board of County 
Commissioners. This is based upon the fact that 
the Code is consistent throughout where it 
requires a development permit and a final site 
plan approval. There may be some ambiguities with 
respect to that retirement/ but the development 
permit process throughout is a consistent theme in 
the Code. 
2. I also do disagree with Mr. Poole when he said 
that the project's architect who, when I asked a 
question, I remember distinctly said that a site 
plan was required, and I do think that he is 
allowed to testify here, and I think his testimony 
is very relevant here when he stated that a site 
plan was required* He is the architect for the 
project. 
3. Under Section 6.14 an approved final site plan ia 
required. A final site plan as determined under 
the code says that a map of a proposed development 
should be filed after approval by the Board of 
County Commissioners. This project falls within 
the final site plan approval process. 
4* While there has been extensive discussion 
concerning definitions under the Code and 
discussions as to whether the Code is ambiguous or 
not, both sides agree that the case of Patterson 
vs. Utah county Board of Adjustment atatea that 
where there is an ambiguity or uncertainty in a 
portion of the statute, it is proper to look to an 
entire act in order to discern its intent and 
meaning, whioh means all of the sections that 
we've looked at tonight. Even assuming that the 
code is reasonably susceptible to different 
interpretations, after reviewing the arguments 
presented by Mr. Poole, the general purpose of the 
Code is that a development of this scale and 
magnitude is required to go through full site plan 
approval by the Planning and County Commissions. 
5. For the reasons presented by Staff in its June 19, 
1997, letter, we adopt Staff*a letter as part of 
our findings. 
The motion was seconded by Board Member Scopes. 
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board Member Perry 
the Board, whether 
course, be up to t 
Staff or to take t 
District Court. J 
that the Wanning 
this meeting and w 
eipplicant out, as 
we're still in Ame 
through, and I'd 1 
not to, that the s 
as possible. 
commented that, whatever the decision or 
confirming or denying this, it would, of 
he appellant to either decide to work with 
his--I guess the next step would be 
ust as a matter of comment, I would hope 
Staff would not be prejudiced because of 
ould do whatever is necessary to help the 
a comment, and not as a mandate, because 
rica and this is a process we're going 
ike to see it work. And if they do choose 
taff would expedite this as expeditiously 
Board Member Scopes stated that he agreed completely. I 
don't think that anyone here wants to see the project not 
fulfilled. Ttfs just that we feel very strongly that the 
project needs to go through the proper process• 
The motion passed 4 to l, with Board Members Perry, 
Scopes, Shapiro, and Weller voting in favor of the 
motion, Board Member Dearay voting against the motion, 
and Board Member Blaazard abstaining from the vote. 
The Special Meeting of the Summit County Board of Adjustment 
adjourned at 8:40 p.m. 
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June 19, 1997 
To: Summit County Board of Adjustment 
From: Doug Dotson, Director 
Department of Community Development 
Subject: Red Barn Development, L.C. 
Appeal of Administrative Decision 
During the hearing on May 27, 1997, the Board of Adjustment (Board) asked for a summary of the 
County's position relative to the above-referenced appeal. The following is a analysis of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code (Development Code) and the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code Administrative Guidelines (Administrative Guidelines) through which the Department of 
Community Development (Department) determined that the Red Barn, L.C. (Applicant) project is 
required to submit a site plan for review by Staff, review by the Snyderville Basin Planning 
Commission (Commission) with a recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners, and 
approval by the Summit County Board of County Commissioners (BCC). 
Given all of the arguments and positions represented by the Applicant, the central issue is as follows: 
Can the applicant's project proceed with only the issuance of a building permit 
following staff review of a site plan or is the applicant required to submit a site 
plan for review and approval by the Planning Commission and BCC before a 
building permit can be issued? 
Analysis Related to Site Plan Approval by the County Commissioners 
The Applicant contends that, since the proposed use is permitted in the Resort Commercial zone, it 
is entitled to a building permit without final site plan review by the Planning Commission and final 
site plan approval by the BCC. With regard to the Applicants position the Department finds the 
following regulations in the Development Code. 
1. Chapter 3, Section 3.6(a)(1) requires a permitted use obtain a development permit prior to 
establishing a use. Section 3.6(a)(1) reads: 
If the Symbol "P" appears in the cell, the use is permitted subject to the 
general requirements for specified uses within the zoning district, this 
Chapter and the applicable performance standards set forth in Chapter 5 of 
this Code. No permitted use shall be established until all required permits 
are obtained including, at a minimum, a development permit. (Emphasis 
added to note that the Applicant's argument fails to include this sentence.) 
It is clear in Section 3.6(a)(1) that the Applicant must obtain a development permit to 
proceed with its project. 
The definition of a development permit is contained in Chapter 2, Section 2.2(43). The 
definition reads: 
Development Permit - any building permit; conditional use permit; 
preliminary subdivision plat; final subdivision plat or other plat approval; 
preliminary site plan; final site plan; rezoning; or any other official action of 
the County or any state or local government commission, board, agency, 
department, or official having the effect of permitting the development of 
land located within the geographic area subject to the provisions of this Code. 
It is clear that if the Applicant pursues the development of its property, it must first obtain 
a development permit. Based on this definition, a development permit can be one of many 
types of permits or approvals listed in Section 2.2(43), including a building permit or a final 
site plan approval. 
Chapter 4, Section 4.12(b) of the Development Code and Section 12.2(1) of the 
Administrative Guidelines elaborates and, in fact, establishes the specific requirements for 
obtaining a building permit. Section 4.12(b) reads: 
Building Permit Required - Any applicant for a building permit shall submit 
an approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a 
conditional use permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or development 
agreement prior to obtaining issuance of a building permit. The permittee 
shall proceed only in accordance with the approved development permit and 
any approved conditions, and shall agree by recorded document to convey no 
portion of the parcel without first obtaining final approval in accordance with 
the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis added) 
Section 12.2(1) reads: 
Development permit required. Any application for a building permit 
shall submit a minor permit or an approved final site plan , final 
subdivision plat, and if applicable , a conditional use permit, master 
preliminary plat, specific plan or development agreement prior to the 
issuance of a building permit. The permittee shall proceed only in 
accordance with the approved development permit and any approved 
conditions, and shall agree by recorded document to convey no 
portion of the parcel without first obtaining final approval in 
accordance with the provisions of the Code. 
The requirements of a final site plan are clearly defined in the development code. Section 
2.2 (98) states that a site plan shall include the following. This information must be 
submitted to Summit County for review purposes. 
Site Plan - a development plan of one or more lots on which is shown: (1) the 
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existing and proposed conditions of the lot, including but not limited to 
topography, vegetation drainage, floodplain, wetlands and waterways; (2) the 
location of all existing and proposed buildings, drives, parking spaces, 
walkways, means or ingress and egress, drainage facilities, utility services, 
landscaping, structures, signs, lighting, and screening devices; (3) the 
location of building pads for residential and non-residential buildings; and (4) 
the location and extent of all external buffers from surrounding areas. 
The minutes of the May 22,1997 Board of Adjustment meeting indicate that the Applicant 
agreed that a site plan was required. Richard Kohler, architect for the Applicant, stated that 
all information for site plan review was submitted to Summit County for review and 
consideration in conjunction with the issuance of a building permit. The Applicant clearly 
stated that the issue was not whether a site plan approval was required, but who was 
responsible for reviewing and approving the site plan for a permitted use. The Applicant 
contends that the Community Development Director can approve the final site plan in 
conjunction with the issuance of a building permit. However, the Development Code does 
not permit the Director to approve a final site plan. Section 2.2 (48) clearly states: 
Final Site Plan - the map of a proposed development to be file after approval 
by the BCC and any accompanying materials as described in this Code. 
The BCC is clearly defined in Section 2.2.(9) of the Development Code. It states: 
BCC - the Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, Utah. 
This is consistent with Sections 4.6(c)(1)(a) and 4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Code 
When reviewed in this context, the Department's position of Section 6.14 of the 
Development Code is correct. Section 6.14 states: 
6.14 Issuance of Building Permits and Certificate of Occupancy 
(a) Except as provided in Section 5.17(d) of this Code, no 
building permit shall be issued for a lot or building unless all public 
improvements as required for any applicable subdivision plat or site 
plan have been completed, or are part of an improvement agreement 
as per Section 6.9 of this Code, as attested to by the Director and 
County Engineer and all applicable service providers. 
(1) The Director may authorize building permits for non-
residential and multi-family dwellings provided that a final 
site plan has been approved by the County and construction 
plans have bee released by the County Engineer. (Emphasis 
added) 
U 3 L'~ 
The Applicant contends that this Section does not preclude the Director from issuing a 
building permit without site plan approval by the Board of County Commissioners. The 
Applicant states that it interprets the term "approved by the County" to refer to any 
authorized official of Summit County, including the Director. However, according to 
Sections 2.2(48), 2.2(9), 4.6(c)(1)(a) and 4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Development Code, described 
above, the authorized entity of Summit County is clearly defined. It is the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
Analysis Related to Review Process for Site Plan Approval 
Once the Applicant develops a site plan in accordance with Section 2.2(98), it must seek approval 
of the site plan. Chapter 4, entitled "Development Application Procedures and Approval Processes," 
and Section 7.2 of the Administrative Guidelines, approved by the Board of County Commissioners 
on January 12, 1993, describe in detail the site plan review and approval process. (The purpose of 
the Administrative Guidelines as defined in Section 2 of the Guidelines "is to assist County Staff and 
applicants in the administration and implementation of the Code".) 
1. With regard to the approval process, Section 4.6(b) of the Development Code describes the 
approval procedures and reads: 
"Approval Procedures. No site plan shall become effective, nor shall 
compliance with the provisions of this Code be determined, until a final site 
plan has been approved by the BCC." 
2. Section 4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Development Code describes the effect of a final site plan and 
reads: 
After a final site plan has been approved by the BCC and filed in the Office 
of the Summit County Recorder, and no subdivision plat is required and no 
final subdivision plat application is pending, the applicant may apply for 
building permits consistent with the proposed site plan. No building permit 
application may be filed with the Building Official until the Director has 
certified that such application conforms to the approved site plan. 
3. Section 7.2(2) of the Administrative Guidelines under the title "Processing Applications for 
Site Plan or Subdivision Plat Approval" reads: 
After the completion of a report and recommendation to the [Planning] 
Commission, the Director shall schedule a hearing on the application before 
the [Planning] Commission. The [Planning] Commission shall conduct the 
hearing and submit its recommendation of the BCC. Within five (5) days 
after the recommendation of the [Planning] Commission has been rendered, 
the Director should place the application and recommendation of the 
[Planning] Commission on the next available regular agenda of the BCC. 
After receiving the recommendation of the [Planning] Commission, the BCC 
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shall consider the application at a public hearing and shall render its decision 
to approve, deny or conditionally approve the application. One (1) copy of 
the preliminary site plan and subdivision plat shall be returned to the 
applicant with the date of approval, conditional approval, or disapproval and 
the reasons therefore accompanying the application. 
4. In accordance with Sections 4.6(b), 4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Development Code and 7.2(2) of the 
Administrative Guidelines, the applicant seeks approval of their site plan and final site plan 
through the recommendation from Planning Commission to the BCC. The process which 
the applicant is being required to follow has been the same process by which the Department 
has been reviewing similar development projects in the Snyderville Basin since the adoption 
of the Development Code in 1993. The Department has consistently brought development 
projects, which are permitted uses in their respective zones, before the Planning Commission 
and the BCC for preliminary site plan and final site plan approval prior to the issuance of 
building permits. Although a member of the Planning Commission, who also represents the 
Applicant, testified that the Planning Commission does not review permitted use, this 
Planning Commission members statement is incorrect and misleading to the Board of 
Adjustment. Exhibits A and B hereto list pending and approved projects that have been or 
will be coming before the Planning Commission and the BCC for review and approval. 
Each of these projects is a permitted use in the zone district in which it is located. 
Analysis Related to Issuance of Building Permits for Single Family Dwellings 
The Applicant also contends that the Department's interpretation of the Development Code is 
discriminatory because the Department does not require that all building permit applications be 
approved by the Board of County Commissioners. The Applicant contends that if Section 4.6 
requires a site plan approval for permitted uses; then, it follows that those persons applying for a 
building permit for a single family residence would require Board of County Commissioner 
approval. The Applicant uses the provision of Section 4.6(b) of the Code that states "no site plan 
shall become effective, nor shall compliance with the provisions of this Code be determined, until 
a final site plan has been approve by the BCC" as a basis for this argument. 
With regard to the Applicants position, the Department finds the following regulations in the 
Development Code. 
1. Chapter 3, Section 3.6(a)(1) requires a permitted use, including single family dwelling units 
in most zone districts, to obtain a development permit prior to establishing a use. Section 
3.6(a)(1) reads: 
If the Symbol "P" appears in the cell, the use is permitted subject to the 
general requirements for specified uses within the zoning district, this 
Chapter and the applicable performance standards set forth in Chapter 5 of 
this Code. No permitted use shall be established until all required permits 
are obtained including, at a minimum, a development permit. (Emphasis 
added to note that the Applicant's argument fails to include this sentence.) 
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2. The definition of a development permit is contained in Chapter 2, Section 2.2(43). The 
definition reads: 
Development Permit - any building permit; conditional use permit; 
preliminary subdivision plat;/ma/ subdivision plat or other plat approval; 
preliminary site plan; final site plan; rezoning; or any other official action of 
the County or any state or local government commission, board, agency, 
department, or official having the effect of permitting the development of 
land located within the geographic area subject to the provisions of this Code. 
3. Chapter 4, Section 4.12(b) of the Development Code elaborates and, in fact, establishes the 
specific requirements for obtaining a building permit. Section 4.12(b) reads: 
Building Permit Required - Any applicant for a building permit shall submit 
an approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a 
conditional use permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or development 
agreement prior to obtaining issuance of a building permit. The permittee 
shall proceed only in accordance with the approved development permit and 
any approved conditions, and shall agree by recorded document to convey no 
portion of the parcel without first obtaining final approval in accordance with 
the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis added) 
Given this information, it should be pointed out that the vast majority of building permits for single 
family dwelling units are issues for lots within approved and platted subdivisions. In other words, 
& final subdivision plat, within which a single family dwelling is being considered for building 
permit purposes, are all previously approved by the Board of County Commissioners. Therefore, 
further review and approval by the Board of County Commissioners is not required. 
There are two instances were a single family dwelling may be considered outside of an approved and 
platted subdivision, including lots that exceed forty (40) acres in size and on legally created non-
conforming parcels. Section 2.2(69) of the Development Code addresses these uses. They are not 
required to obtain Board of County Commissioner approval. They can simply obtain a minor permit 
from Summit County. The related provision of the Development Code are as follows: 
69. Minor Permit - a development permit authorizing any of the following: 
69.1 new single lot or single unit residential uses on a parcel greater than forty 
(40) acres in a site located outside of a platted or recorded subdivision; 
69.6 all single lot or single unit residential uses on existing parcel that would 
otherwise be rendered unbuildable pursuant to the density restrictions of 
Section 5.13 herein. 
These two allowable instances are included in the Development Code to accommodate land owners 
whose non-conforming property were in existent prior to the adoption of the Development Code in 
1977 and 1992. 
Approval of Other Uses 
A Planning Commissioner representing the Applicant stated in the May 22, 1997 Board of 
Adjustment meeting that other permitted uses have been approved in a manner that did not require 
Planning Commission or Board of County Commissioner approval. Reference was made to the 
green tennis bubble and ski lifts at Wolf Mountain. It should be noted for the record that the green 
tennis bubble is not approved as a permitted use. Rather, Wolf Mountain made application for the 
tennis bubble as a temporary use/activity under the Development Code's Minor Permit provision. 
As such, it was reviewed through the Minor use provisions of Section 2.2(69.4) of the Development 
Code. It is not approved as a permanent facility and must be removed upon expiration of the minor 
permit. 
The above mentioned ski lifts were approved previously by the Planning Commission and the Board 
of County Commissioners as a Class II Development Permit for "Project Ski-91,f under the 1985 
Development Code for the Wolf Mountain area. The Minor Permit provision, Section 2.2(69.3), of 
the Development Code, authorizes certain uses as long as the project is an amendment to an 
approved development permit. 
Ambiguity in the Interpretation of the Code 
The applicant has argued that based on the reading of Section 3.6(a)(1), the Development Code is 
ambiguous and therefore, the Board must liberally construe the code in favor of the property owner. 
The applicant's argument is based on the Court of Appeals of Utah, case Patterson v. Utah County. 
Board of Adjustment, which defines how an ambiguous code provision should be interpreted. The 
court wrote in that case that: 
[W]here there is an ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion of a statute, it is proper to 
look to an entire act in order to discern its meaning and intent; and if it is reasonably 
susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be chosen which best 
harmonizes with its general purpose. Indeed, this court will "divine the meaning of 
[a provision in] the county zoning ordinance ... from the general purpose of the 
ordinance. 
If an ambiguity exists, which the Department has clearly argued does not, the court requires that it 
is proper to look to the entire act in order to discern its meaning and if the act is still suspect, one 
should choose the best act which harmonizes with the acts general purposes. These two test of an 
acts' (Code) ambiguity have to be applied before a decision is rendered in favor of the property 
owner. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the above analysis of the Development Code and Administrative Guidelines, it is clear 
that there is a logical and understandable process with specific requirements the applicant needs to 
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followed in order to obtain issuance of a building permit. Moreover, the same review and approval 
process has been applied to all other permitted uses that have been approved by Summit County 
since the adoption of the Development Code in January of 1993. Furthermore, it is clear the 
Department has been consistent in the enforcement of the Development Code with the issuance of 
building permits for single family dwelling units and is not acting in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner against the applicant. 
The applicant argues that it is not subject to certain Chapters of the Development Code, particularly 
Chapter 4, since Section 3.6(a)(1) does not specifically state that permitted uses are subject to 
Chapter 4. However, as pointed out above, the Development Code does, in fact, require the 
Applicant to submit a final site plan for approval by the Board of County Commissioners before a 
building permit will be issued. As a result the Applicant's project is subject to the provisions of 
Chapter 4.0. Denial of the issuance of a building permit by the Director is, therefore, authorized 
by the Development Code because the applicant does not have a final site plan approved by the 
BCC. 
Finally, the Applicant argues the Department is acting outside of the development review powers 
granted to Summit County by the State Legislature. The U.C.A. 17-27-102 gives counties broad 
land use authority (see also Patterson v. Utah County. Board of Adjustment, 893 P2d 602, 606-607 
(Utah App. 1995): State v. Hutchison. 624 P2d 1126.1127 (Utah 1980)). Furthermore, U.C.A. 17-
27-104 allows counties to impose more restrictive standards than the State Legislature would require. 
Although a commercial development did not require a subdivision plat under U.C.A. 17-27-804, the 
State Statue is silent as to the requirement of site plans, which as noted in our argument, is required 
under our Development Code. Clearly, the county has authority to require such an approval process 
in its development Code, under State Law. In fact, the state code has been amended as of May 5, 
1997, to require commercial development to have a subdivision plat requirement as well. 
Subsequently, the Applicant's attack on the Development Code, asserting that its provisions on site 
plans are unreasonable, is outside the scope of the Board of Adjustment powers of review. Such an 
argument should have been raised in accordance with U.C.A. 17-27-1001 at the time of the 
enactment of the Development Code, or as a constitutional substantive due process claim. 
One other point should be made regarding the Applicant's claim. Many of the so-called permitted 
uses identified in the Development Code do create impacts on surrounding properties. If the 
approval of the Applicant's multi-family development were handled only through a building permit 
review process, it would be impossible to determine any applicable and reasonable concerns from 
surrounding property owners. The issuance of a building permit, for example, does not require a 
public hearing, giving property owners the opportunity to voice concerns. The purpose is not to 
deny the use at that location. After all, it is a permitted use. The purpose is, however, to ensure that 
the use, in this case a multi-family development, minimizes all impacts on surrounding properties. 
This, too, is part of the due process entitled to residents of the Snyderville Basin. 
I recommend the Board of Adjustment uphold the decision to deny the issuance of a building permit 
to Red Barn Development, L.C. until the project is reviewed and approved under the site plan review 
process as outlined in the Development Code. 
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Exhibit A. 
Recently Approved "Permitted Use" Developments 
Silver Creek Business Park 
Kimball Center 
Washington Mutual Bank 
Spring Creek Plaza 
Smith's Store 
Village at Kimball Junction 
Storage Units, Silver Creek Industrial Park 
First Security Bank 
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EXHIBIT B 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
I SUMMIT COUNTY PUNNING DIVISION 
6/9/97 Snyderville Basin Planning District 
PROJECT/LOCATION 
GOSHAWK 
J. GRAHAM, SUBD 
SILVER CREEK 
SILVER SAGE 
J. GRAHAM, SUBD. 
SILVER CREEK 
SPRING CREEK ASSOC. 
M.BARNES/J.DOILNEY, SKETCH 
BITNER ROAD SWANER 
SHADOW MOUNTAIN 
D. ARMSTRONG. SUBDIVISION 
OLD RANCH ROAD 
WALLIN 
J. MCCOMAS, SKETCH PLAN 
HWY224 
KIMBALL PLAZA 
M.MCPHIE, PRELIM 
KIMBALL JUNCTION 
SUMMIT CENTER COMP 
M. ALLRED, SKETCH PU\N 
RASMUSSEN ROAD 
SUMMIT WATER DIST. 
J. DESPAIN. SITE PLAN j 
RASMUSSEN ROAD 
SILVER SUMMIT 
T. DIDAS, MAJOR SUBD 
HWY. 40 SILVER SUMMIT 
TIMBERWOLF CONDOS 
J. FOGG, SKETCH PU\N 
WOLF MOUNTAIN 
AMES, ED 
MINOR PERMIT 
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Shapiro explained that the Code is in place and accessible 
to the public. Mr. Davis agreed to provide a topographical 
map for review at the next meeting. 
Board Member Perry made a motion to table the item to 
allow the applicant to demonstrate that there is a 
greater hardship than what has been presented and 
recommended that Staff, due to the lack of 
communication, try to help expedite the process for the 
applicant. The motion was seconded by Board Member 
Shapiro and passed unanimously, 4 to 0. 
3. Appeal of Administrative Decision, Red Barn Development, 
Dennis Poole 
Planner Deis presented the staff report and explained that 
the applicant is appealing a decision made by Community 
Development Director Doug Dotson concerning the processing 
requirements for the Snyderville Basin Development Code for 
a multi-family, lodge-type development located on Highway 
224 near Wolf Mountain. The applicant contends that the 
project does not need to be reviewed and approved by the 
Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners 
through the site plan approval process and has requested 
that building permits be issued for the immediate 
construction of the multi-family units. The applicant bases 
this on the fact that the proposed use is a permitted use in 
the zone. Director Dotson denied the request based on 
requirements of the Snyderville Basin Development Code that 
all projects, whether permitted or conditional uses, must 
receive site plan approval from the Planning Commission and 
Board of County Commissioners prior to the issuance of any 
building permits. 
Planner Deis explained that the issue is why the applicant 
needs to have a site plan review. The explanation is that 
it is one of the requirements of the Code prior to issuance 
of a building permit. He explained the site plan review 
process using other projects as examples and noted that site 
plan review is required because there are always issues on a 
site which are critical for the Planning Department to 
understand in terms of locating houses, roads, 
infrastructure, etc. Projects must be reviewed by 21 
service providers who identify important aspects such as 
water, public utilities, air quality, wildlife resources, 
wildfire hazard, sewer, fire department response time, etc. 
Sight distances on roads are reviewed by the County Engineer 
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as well as proper turnaround areas and access into other 
lots. 
Board Member Shapiro asked if there are any approvals 
without going through a site plan approval process in Summit 
County. Planner Deis explained that there are approvals 
only if a person wants to build one single-family residence 
on one lot. Board Member Shapiro asked if there is a 
provision in the Code for that. Planner Deis explained that 
a single-family residence goes through a building permit 
approval process, which has its own criteria. 
Planner Deis explained that the Department of Community 
Development has used these standards since 1993, and every 
subdivision that comes in for approval must meet the same 
requirements. This application is not a unique case. He 
cited Section 4.1 of the Code which states that no 
development may be undertaken within the unincorporated 
areas of Snyderville Basin without issuance of the required 
development permits in accordance with the Code. 
Board Member Shapiro asked for the definition in the Code 
that applies to development permits and why single-family 
dwellings do not require site approval by the Planning 
Commission and Board of County Commissioners. He asked for 
the definition of that differentiation. Planner Deis stated 
that it would take some time to review the Code to find the 
exact reference. 
Planner Deis referred to the definition of a development 
permit in the Code as provided to the Board Members. A 
reasonable person would look at that definition and 
determine that they need a development permit and determine 
what is required to obtain it. He referred to the 
development matrix in Section 3.6 of the Code which outlines 
the permitted and conditional uses in each zone. The matrix 
explains that use is permitted subject to the general 
requirements for specific uses within the zoning district 
and refers to the performance standards set forth in Chapter 
5* It further states that no permitted use shall be 
established until all required permits are obtained, include 
at a minimum, development permits. A development permit 
requires a site plan, preliminary plan, and final plat. 
Board Member Shapiro referred to 6.14(a)(1) which states 
that the Director may authorize building permits for non-
residential multi-family dwellings provided that a final 
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site plan has been approved by the County. He felt the 
issue was not whether a site plan is required but who makes 
the decision on a site plan. He asked if that is the issue 
at hand. Planner Deis explained that the issue is whether a 
site plan review is required, which does require review by 
the Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners. 
Board Member Shapiro asked what the word "County" refers to. 
He asked if that term is defined. Planner Deis stated that 
he believed the State Statute defines it as the legislative 
body, which would be the Planning Commission and Board of 
county Commissioners. 
Planner Deis referred to Chapter 5 contains the criteria by 
which site plans are reviewed. Section 4.12 deals with the 
building permit process, which states that no development 
shall occur except pursuant to a valid, issued, unexpired 
and unrevoked building permit. It further states that all 
applicants for a building permit shall submit an approved 
final site plan. He noted that, to get to a final site 
plan, you have to do either a preliminary plan which is 
reviewed and turns into a site plan on multi-family homes or 
a preliminary subdivision plat for single-family homes. 
Sections 6.14 discusses issuance of building permits and 
states that, except as provided in Section 5.17(a), no 
building permit shall be issued for a lot or building site 
unless all public improvements required for any applicable 
subdivision plat or site plan has been completed* A 
subdivision plat cannot be reached without a site plan 
review. In Section 4.6(c)(1) it states that the preliminary 
site plan shall not authorize the development of land. 
After the preliminary site plan has been reviewed by the 
BCC, the applicant may file for a final site plan. A final 
site plan cannot be acquired without a site plan review. He 
referred to the Administrative Guidelines, Section 7.1 which 
explains that preliminary plan review and site plan review 
can be processed concurrently. It is clear that the Code 
requires site plan review, and it is consistent throughout 
the Code. Planner Deis explained that the standard is that 
a reasonable, well informed person can understand what is 
required in the Code, and there is no ambiguity about it. 
The Code must be looked at as a whole, and it is in place to 
ensure that development is done in a very sane and orderly 
manner and meets health, safety, and welfare criteria. Staff 
recommends, based on the Code sections cited and the 
information contained in the staff report, that the Board 
make a decision to uphold the Director* s decision to deny 
the issuance of building permits for the Red Barn 
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development project until the project is reviewed and 
approved under the site plan approval process as outlined in 
the Administrative Guidelines. Without the site plan 
review, developments can potentially be constructed with no 
regard to site layout, buffering, setbacks, environmental 
constraints, infrastructure adequacy, etc. site plan review 
and approval ensures that the development complies with the 
Code's standards and requirements, and the project does not 
become a detriment to the County. 
Dennis Poole, attorney for the applicant, stated that the 
proposed project is not a subdivision. The Code defines 
subdivision as any land which is "divided" or proposed to be 
divided or re-subdivided into two or more lots. This is not 
proposed to be divided. It is a resort commercial use, 
lodge-type, with separate buildings, with one owner, on one 
large parcel. He reminded the Board that their job is to 
decide what the Code says, not to set policy. 
Board Member Shapiro asked when the Administrative 
Guidelines were adopted. Planner Deis responded that they 
were adopted at approximately the same time as the 
Development Code. 
Mr. Poole explained that a sketch plan was requested and 
submitted to the development department prior to the 
application of March 21, 1997. Director Dotson wanted to 
treat the application as an application for a preliminary 
site plan, but the applicant does not feel they are required 
to submit any site plans due to an argument based on a 
logical, reasonable reading of the Code, and an argument 
related to a requirement of Summit County not to act in an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or abusive manner. 
Mr. Poole explained that zoning codes are authorized by the 
State Legislature, and are usually adopted first by 
development of a General Plan, then by enacting a zoning 
ordinance to implement the General Plan. The General Plan 
anticipates permitted and conditional uses. Permitted uses 
are presumed to be permitted without the need for any 
special kind of review due to circumstances. He cited 
Section 3.5 regarding application of zoning district 
regulations. Subparagraph (d) states that uses shall be 
limited to those identified in the scheduled uses as a 
permitted use or a conditional use. Section 3.6 was 
discussed as it pertains to the application, which states 
that the application must meet the requirements of this 
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chapter, not Chapter 4, and the applicable performance 
standards in Chapter 5. He referred to the term 
"development" and read the definition of "development" from 
the Code. He maintained that, according to the definition, 
which includes the definition of a conditional use permit to 
which the applicant is not subject, the Code is ambiguous. 
He stated that, when the Code is ambiguous, it must be 
interpreted in favor of the landowner. 
Board Member Shapiro asked Mr. Poole to explain the 
ambiguity. Mr. Poole explained that the Code states they 
are required to obtain a development permit. He questioned 
which development permit—one or all of the ones defined. 
He asked who gets to decide which one applies, 
Mr. Poole referred to 3.6(a)(2) regarding conditional uses 
and referring to Section 3.7. Permitted uses do not have a 
specific section one can refer to as can be done with 
conditional uses. Section 3.7 states that conditional uses 
are those which are generally compatible with the uses in 
the zoning district, but which, because of their size, 
scale, intensity of use, traffic generation, or other 
characteristics, require individual review of their 
location, design, configuration, and the imposition of 
conditions in order to ensure the appropriateness of a use 
in a particular location within a given zoning district. It 
does not state that individual review is required for a 
permitted use. In paragraph 3.7(b) regarding conditional 
uses, it states "site plan required." Such language is 
absent regarding permitted use. He referred to 3.6(a)(1) 
and noted that it does not make reference to Chapter 4. He 
then referred to Chapter 4 referring to all development 
permits applicable and required. He noted that Section 4.6 
states the types of applications requiring a site plan, and 
they are not requesting any of those types of applications. 
His interpretation was that neither a preliminary site plan 
nor a site plan would be required for this project. Planner 
Deis explained that Chapter 4, Development Application 
Procedures of Approval Processes, describes the process 
which is followed in order to obtain certain approvals. 
Richard Kohler, the project architect and a member of the 
Planning Commission said: "I think that some of this about 
having the site plan, Dennis is being an attorney. 
Practically, in order to get a building permit, we have to 
prepare a site plan. All of the objective standards are the 
water, fire, all of those things, have to be reviewed in the 
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building permit process. So, don't split hairs. That's all 
I'm saying. Don't split hairs to death about does the site 
plan need to be done, because clearly, they get done and 
they get approved and they have all of the information that 
we would have otherwise. It* s just who reviews them and 
approves them. I believe that it's just simply the Staff 
and the building permit people. It doesn't go to the 
Planning Commission. 
Mr. Poole stated that the summary argument he would make is 
that the Code is ambiguous. A very detailed sketch plan, 
legal descriptions, drawings and all other requirements were 
submitted to Staff who could review and determine that the 
objective criteria were satisfied for the project. 
Mr. Kohler stated that it fulfills all the requirements that 
even if—what we did was we went overboard a little bit, 
because I' m on the Planning Commission. That1 s why . . . 
short circuit the process. We've put in everything that you 
would do for preliminary site plan, final site plan, 
vegetation map, slope maps, parking studies, literally all 
of the information that we would have done, so that there1 s 
kind of, in effect, overkill. we' re not trying to, again, 
as a practical matter, we' re not trying to short circuit the 
information that the County gets. It' s just a process issue 
for us. Well, you see, when I have the job, it's a 
permitted use that should never come before the Planning 
Commission. 
Mr. Poole reviewed Section 4.12 which he also felt was 
ambiguous, and if he took it literally, he would have to 
file a subdivision plat. However, according to the 
definition, the applicant is not doing a subdivision. In 
the Administrative Guidelines, Section 4.4.3, which 
discusses a building permit as use by right, which he 
interpreted as being a permitted use. It states that the 
Director has an obligation to determine with 10 days of the 
application if the application is sufficient. Section 
4.2(b)(1) of the Code states that the Director has an 
obligation to review and make a recommendation on 
applications, and he must notify the applicant within a 
certain time frame if there are any deficiencies. He stated 
that no deficiencies were noted by Director Dotson other 
than his determination that the applicant needed a 
preliminary site plan approved. He did not say there were 
any deficiencies in the site plan. He contended that the 
Director could not deny it because there was nothing wrong 
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with it, and he just wanted to delay the process by putting 
them on the agenda for the Planning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners. He cited a Utah Supreme Court 
decision which ruled that various government authorities 
charged with responsibility for administrating local zoning 
and planning ordinances are under a basic duty to act 
reasonably. He stated that, if this is a permitted use by 
definition and a Conditional Use Permit is not required, he 
asked what the Planning Commission and Board of County 
Commissioners would do when they received the application. 
There would be nothing for them to sign, and the Director 
should have made the decision. He felt that was not 
reasonable and was arbitrary and capricious. The exception 
for single-family residences makes it more arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Mr. Shapiro asked for Mr. Poole's definition of "County" in 
Section 6.14. Mr. Poole responded that, according to the 
definition, it means Summit County, so he interpreted that 
as being any authorized officer of the County. 
Mr. Kohler stated, as an architect, I' m not—I know you guys 
are attorneys and you get into this pretty deep. I know 
that after the 1992 Code was adopted that on Wolf Mountain, 
which is in the same RC zone, that green tennis bubble was 
approved as a permitted use and did not go through this 
process that' s being proposed for us. So, it certainly 
hasn' t been consistent, at least in that, because people 
would have come out if that green tennis bubble had gone 
through the thing and there would be people coming out to 
the meetings. One thing Kevin said earlier, and I have a 
problem with it, Kevin said that, in the typical thing, you 
can build a single family house on this 4-1/2 acre lot. 
That actually is not true. If you look back in the table, 
the single-family detached dwelling is a conditional use in 
this zone. The hotel use or the lodging use is the 
permitted use. Planner Deis responded that, when he said 
that, he was not referring to the specific zone in which 
they are building. 
Chair DeGray opened the public hearing. 
Robert Fogg was sworn in. He commented that the application 
was submitted last August. 
Jim Fogg, one of the owners of the project, stated that all 
applicable fees were paid and they went to great lengths to 
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prepare the application properly, and Mr. Kohler had tried 
to keep them on track. 
Board Member Shapiro was concerned with Mr. Poole' s 
interpretation of Section 6.14 that the Director is Summit 
County. The section states that the Director may authorize 
it provided that it has been approved by the County. He 
viewed that as two separate and distinct decision makers. 
Mr. Poole felt the language could be looked at as a 
prohibition when a final site plan is necessary. However, 
he did not feel that a final site plan was necessary in 
their situation. Mr. Shapiro noted that the architect had 
stated that the argument is not whether a site plan is 
required but who approves the site plan. Assuming that a 
final site plan is required, he asked Mr. Poole who would 
make that approval under the Code. Mr. Poole believed that, 
when it is interpreted as a whole, it has to be the Staff. 
If this is interpreted the way the Staff wants it 
interpreted, there is no permitted use in the County, and 
that is not reasonable. 
Board Member Scopes quoted from the Director's letter that 
he had denied the request based on requirement in the Code 
that all projects, whether permitted or conditional uses, 
must receive site plan approval from the Planning Commission 
and Board of County Commissioners prior to building permit 
issuance. He asked if the applicant thinks the Director 
doesn't need to approve it or whether they don't want to 
submit the site plan or that they feel that the site plan 
has already been approved by Staff? He was unsure what the 
specific question is. 
Mr. Kohler stated, I guess what I'd say is that, even though 
it says that, find in the Code where it says that. I think 
it's a process question. The staff has outlined us going 
through what is, in effect, a conditional use process, the 
same as if we were a conditional use, and we' re, in fact, 
not. Therefore, we should not go to the Planning 
Commission, or my body, nor before the Board of County 
Commissioners. It makes no sense for a permitted use to go 
those routes. That' s not just the case in Summit County, 
that' s the case in Logan or places I appear before as an 
architect. Permitted uses go to some member designated by 
the Staff, you work with them, and when you've got it the 
way you want it, you just go get the building permits, and 
usually it' s called a planning sub-check. You take it into 
the building department and they go back to the zoning 
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people and planning, and you don' t even see the planning 
people that might have dealt with it. 
Board Member Scopes asked if the project has not yet been 
reviewed. Planner Deis explained that it has been reviewed 
by the Community Development Director and the Senior 
Planner, and they found that the intricacies of the project 
would require a site plan review. He explained that the 
document presented by Mr, Poole was presented as a sketch 
plan. Under the definition of the Code, a sketch plan is 
referred to as a sketch preparatory to the preliminary plat 
or site plan. Board Member Scopes asked the applicant why 
he doesn't just submit the site plan for review. 
Mr. Poole showed the Board the application submitted on 
March 21 which was denied, and it says final site plan 
approval. He felt that Staff should have reviewed the site 
plan and approved or denied it. He read from the letter of 
denial dated April 15 which stated that the Director had 
chosen to consider their application as one for preliminary 
site plan approval. 
Board Member Perry explained Mr. Poole!s argument indicates 
that a permit would abrogate any process at all other than 
that you just submit something to the Director. A director 
is hired to make the decisions about what is required when a 
project is submitted. He explained that permitted use can 
cover a gamut of areas. Permitted use does not mean that 
you can come in an do anything you want without following 
the processes, and the Director is hired to make the 
executive decisions regarding the process required. 
Otherwise, there would be no purpose in having a Planning 
Commission, a County Commission, or even a Code. 
Mr. Poole felt that determination was made when the Code was 
adopted and the distinction was made between a permitted and 
conditional use. When the County Commission adopted the 
Code, they said they wanted to look at conditional uses, but 
they did not want to spend their time reviewing permitted 
uses, because a permitted use do not have the size, scale, 
and intensity of use characteristics which require 
individual review. The authority for reviewing compliance 
with the requirements is delegated to the Director and the 
Staff. 
Board Member Scopes explained that the Director has made 
that decision that the Director has made the decision that 
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the application requires site plan approval. Mr. Poole 
contended that the Director was wrong in that decision. 
Mr. Thomas explained that the statute allows any zoning 
decision of a County official to be appealed to the Board of 
Adjustment which decides whether or not an error was made. 
This appears to be a difference of opinion in the way the 
Code is interpreted. Where there is an ambiguity or 
uncertainty in a portion of the statute, it is proper to 
look at the entire act to discern its meaning and intent. 
If it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretation, 
the one should be chosen which best harmonizes with the 
general purpose. The Board should look at the entire Code, 
everything stated by the applicant, and everything stated by 
Staff, in terms of harmonizing the provisions to get to the 
correct interpretation of the Code. The provisions should 
be reconciled in terms of site plan approval and that the 
Board Members read Mr. Dotson* s letter as well as all Code 
sections cited by both parties. After doing so, a 
determination should be made based on all of the 
information. 
Mr. Poole explained that the rule of common law states that 
people can use their land for whatever purpose they desire. 
Because of that law, if there is ambiguity in the statute, 
the Code should be construed in favor of the property owner. 
He claimed that the Code is so muddled that there is no 
clear intention relative to this issue. 
Board Member Shapiro read the definition of a permitted use, 
a building permit stating that it requires an approved final 
site plan. Section 6.14(a)(1) states that the Director may 
authorize a building permit for a non-residential multi-
family dwelling, which is what the applicant is proposing, 
provided final site plan has approved by the County. He 
interpreted the Code as saying that the Director is one 
entity and the County is another thing, which he interprets 
as some kind of governing body. 
Board Member Perry asked how many items are before the 
Planning Commission and if any of them are permitted uses. 
Mr. Kohler responded that, no, we have no permitted uses to 
my knowledge that have come before the Planning Commission. 
None. Most of what comes before us is subdivisions, which 
Kevin showed you a couple of examples of. Planner Deis 
explained that, in order to go through the subdivision 
process, an applicant is required to go through a site plan 
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review. Mr. Poole is arguing that this is not a 
subdivision, but the remainder of the definition states that 
a subdivision also includes condominiums, tracts, other 
divisions for the purpose of offer, sale, lease. If this is 
going to be a lodge, hotel rooms will be leased out. He 
felt that Mr. Poole appeared to want to be very specific in 
interpreting the Code in some areas, but in other areas he 
did not want to be specific. He felt that Mr. Pooled 
massaging of the Code does not support his argument since he 
does not fully accept all the definitions in the Code. Mr. 
Poole quoted from the Code that subdivision includes the 
division or development of land, whether by deed, metes and 
bounds description, provides testacy lease, all premised 
upon the division of land. He maintained that they are not 
dividing land. Planner Deis was asked to read the permitted 
uses in the RC Zone from the matrix. 
Mr. Kohler stated that Wolf Mountain recently, in the RC 
Zone, installed two lifts to do transportation through a 
permitted use. They didn' t come before the Planning 
Commission. Planner Deis explained that was because Wolf 
Mountain has an existing master plan, and such minor 
improvements may be done by minor permit with an existing 
master plan. Mr. Poole asked whether he would have to go 
through this process if he wanted to farm 20 acres. Planner 
Deis explained that a building permit is not required in 
order to farm. It was clarified that a building permit 
would be required to build a barn on the farm. Mr. Kohler 
stated that, if you were building a barn, you certainly 
wouldn' t. You would go directly and get a building permit. 
Mr. Thomas explained that the state statute provides special 
exceptions for agricultural uses. 
Chair DeGray clarified that the development is multi-family, 
resort commercial, lodge for overnight stay, and the units 
will be rented on a nightly basis. It was confirmed that 
they could also be used on a long-term rental basis. 
Planner Deis explained that those would be considered leased 
units, and it clearly states in the Code that that would be 
considered a subdivision. 
Mr. Kohler stated that, as a member of the Planning 
Commission, I want to say something. And Kevin1 s kind of 
off on his own here in my mind. There are some practical 
problems that Summit County has to deal with. We1 re trying 
to adopt a new Code. This Code does have deficiencies. 
These are some of them that we' re talking about. We' ve 
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allowed too much in both the community commercial and the RC 
zone, and there are permitted uses that we really probably 
need to look at more stringently. That* s why we have 
proposed a new master plan and a new process, because these 
deficiencies exist. I think that when you look at the 
backlog, people get on the Planning Commission now, most of 
the people coming on there have been in the pipeline for 
longer than a year. So, there' s a significant backlog, and 
most of them are larger tracts of land which are clearly 
conditional uses and some of these that should come before 
the Planning Commission. To add and take all of the 
permitted uses, which is what this—there's a policy 
commitment. You1 re making a major policy decision. I guess 
you* re recommending a major policy decision. It* s never 
been a public debate, and I know Ron was on the County 
Commission when the Ordinance got adopted. I find it hard 
to believe that the public or the County Commissioners or 
the Staff at the time the Ordinance was adopted thought that 
there would be no such thing in Summit County, or that came 
out at meetings, as permitted uses that would go through the 
process differently than the conditional uses or the 
subdivisions. I just find it very hard to believe. I find 
also that it would be a very difficult, if you took that 
position, the Board of Adjustment or whoever, whatever body 
took that position, that would be an untenable position for 
the County to maintain in light of all the many hostile 
people we have already for lots of other reasons. I think 
it adds to the applicant's claims of lack of due process 
which we already—that' s probably our most vulnerable thing 
in some of the largest projects that we' ve had. Some of 
them have been in the process since 1990. I think I'm 
speaking not so much as the applicant, but really just a 
resident of Summit County, and not trying to make a mess up 
here of what we' re doing in zoning, and not trying to make 
an interim mess that my body or somebody else will have to 
clean up after the fact. I just think we have to be 
judicious and equitable in our treatment of landowners and 
applicants, and I think the tone of what Kevin and the Staff 
are doing is clearly not that. 
Board Member Shapiro asked if going through a governing body 
wasn't just as much due process as going through the 
Director. Mr. Kohler responded, no. What I'm saying is, in 
order to interpret the Ordinance, what you1 re doing is 
you' re saying there1 s no such thing as a permitted use in 
Summit County despite the fact that there1 s a table that has 
a distinction between permitted and conditional uses, and 
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for the Staff to do that increases the backlog and the 
pressure in a lot of different ways and doesn' t really serve 
the community in the end. The correct probably process is 
to put the right things with p* s and the right things with 
c' s and get them set straight and the process them more 
correctly. But expeditiously, certainly there must be some 
things in the resort commercial zone that are permitted 
uses. I hope that we' re one of the ones that will remain, 
and that seems reasonable to me. If you have a resort, then 
you have hotels and lodging as a permitted use. That you 
would make single family owner occupied when it* s a 
conditional use, that protects the resort. That* s a policy 
decision that the Planning Commission, or the Board of 
County Commissioners on the Planning Commission1 s 
recommendation could and would make. The interpretation the 
Staff's trying to make I don't think is supported by the 
public sentiment in general, that of the Planning Commission 
or the County Commission, nor was it at a prior date when 
the Ordinance was adopted. I just don' t believe that. 
Planner Deis agreed that there are several projects 
currently in the process and are moving slowly, but that is 
not because of Staff s interpretation of the Code. It is 
because there is a sizable amount of development occurring 
in the Snyderville Basin with only three planners and one 
planning technician to handle them all. Fie felt the backlog 
was not relevant to the decision to be made by the Board. 
Mr. Poole felt it was relevant, because reasonable people 
would not define a permitted use and expect it to go through 
the same process as a conditional use. Planner Deis stated 
that is also not reasonable to allow a project to go ahead 
just because there is a backlog. Mr. Poole argued that the 
reason for having a permitted use is so those bodies don't 
have to consider that, so Mr. Deis's interpretation of 
adding to the burden is contrary to the general policy of 
the Code. There was an intent to create a permitted use, 
and if there is no distinction between the two, then 
permitted use is written out of the Code. 
Board Member Shapiro commented that all permitted uses 
require a building permit, and as he traces it through the 
Code, it states that a site plan is required for a building 
permit. 
Chair DeGray stated that he understood why the Director 
wanted to exert some control over a project that would 
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obviously have impacts due to its size. He questioned 
whether this type of use in the zone should be a permitted 
use. He felt it should probably be a conditional use with 
the magnitude and densities that the applicant is asking 
for. 
Mr. Poole returned to Section 4.6 regarding the site plan, 
and stated that if it is taken literally as being required 
for any building permit, every one of them would have to be 
approved by the Board of County Commissioners. 
Chair DeGray closed the public hearing. 
Planner Deis stated that it is very clear that one of the 
conditions of a permitted use is that no permit shall be 
established until the required permits are obtained. 
Sections 4.6 and 4.12 both require a final site plan, as 
well as a final subdivision plat prior to the issuance of a 
building permit. Supreme Court cases have upheld the 
reasonableness of a master plan in guiding development. He 
explained that the Code, when taken as a whole, is not 
ambiguous at all. He stated that the applicant simply did 
not obtain the proper approvals, and the Director was within 
his rights to not accept it because the applicant did not 
have site plan approval. 
Mr. Kohler stated that Kevin is making an interpretation 
that, if you turn in an application with a final site plan, 
before that you would have had to go through a preliminary 
site plan. 
Chair DeGray stated that the discussion is whether a site 
plan at all was required. 
Chair DeGray commented that this item could have a 
substantial effect on the way the County Staff has been 
doing business for the last several years. He stated that 
he would entertain a motion to table the item until the next 
meeting to give Board Members time to review the material 
presented at this meeting. 
Mr. Thomas stated that, if the item is tabled, the Board 
should receive a copy of the minutes and a copy of the Code 
as soon as possible. He cautioned the Board Members not to 
discuss the matter with each other prior to the next 
meeting. Any necessary Code information will be readily 
available from Staff, but the minutes will not be ready 
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until the end of next week. Mr. Poole stated that the 
applicant would rather have a denial than wait. Board 
Member Shapiro stated that the Board would not give him a 
denial, because the Board is not ready to make a decision. 
Planner Deis agreed to send the Board Members a copy of the 
entire Code with applicable sections highlighted. Mr. Poole 
asked to have access to all the information provided to the 
Board. 
Board Member Perry made a motion to continue the item 
until the next regular meeting on June 19. The motion 
was seconded by Board Member Scopes and passed 
unanimously, 4 to 0. 
Chair DeGray explained that at the next meeting there will 
be discussion among the Board, and public input will be kept 
to a minimum. The Board was admonished not to discuss the 
issue with anyone prior to the next session. 
The Regular Meeting of the Summit County Board of Adjustment 
adjourned at 9:20 p.m. 
Mirrutes Approved 
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Staff Report to the Summit County Board of Adjustment 
(5/22/97 Agenda Item) 
Appeal of administrative decision requiring the proposed Red Barn Development to comply with 
site plan standards and process as outlined in the Snyderville Basin Development Code 
Overview/Background 
The applicant, Red Barn Development, L.C. represented by attorney Dennis Poole, has appealed 
a decision made by the Director of Community Development regarding the processing 
requirements in the Snyderville Basin Development Code for a proposed multi-family/lodge type 
development on Highway 224 near Wolf Mountain. The applicant contends that the project does 
not need to be reviewed and approved by the Planning Commission and Board of County 
Commissioners through the Site Plan approval process, and has requested that Building Permits 
be issued for the immediate construction of the multi-family units. The applicant bases this on 
the fact that the proposed use is a permitted use within the zoning district. The Director has 
denied this request based on the requirement in the Snyderville Basin Development Code that all 
projects, whether permitted or conditional uses, must receive Site Plan approval from the 
Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners prior to Building Permit issuance. 
Analysis 
A Site Plan is a development plan for one or more lots/parcels which shows the existing and 
proposed conditions of the property. A Site Plan shows topography, vegetation, drainage, 
floodplain, wetlands, waterways, the location of existing and proposed buildings and structures, 
drives, parking, walkways, ingress/egress, utilities, landscaping, signs, lighting, etc. Site Plans 
are used to illustrate how proposed development, such as the Red Barn project, comply with all 
the development code regulations and requirements. Once it has been determined, through a 
review procedure, that the Site Plan complies with all development regulations, the plan is 
approved and used to guide construction activity on the site. 
It has been the interpretation of the Summit County Department of Community Development 
since 1993 and the adoption of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, that all projects, 
whether permitted or conditional uses, are required to receive Final Site Plan Approval prior to 
the issuance of Building Permits. This interpretation is based on the following Code sections: 
•Section 4.1 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code states, "No development or 
development activity may be undertaken within the [Snyderville Basin] unless all development 
permits applicable to the proposed development are issued in accordance with die provisions of 
the Code." 
•Section 3.6 indicates that permitted uses are subject to the general requirements and applicable 
performance standards set forth in the Code, and no permitted uses shall be established until all 
0^7? 
required permits are obtained. The Site Plan process is the mechanism under which these 
performance standards are evaluated and the determination is made as to whether or not the 
proposed project complies with the Code requirements. 
•Section 4.12 states, "Any applicant for a Building Permit shall submit an approved Final Site 
Plan, Final Subdivision Plat, and, if applicable, a Conditional Use Permit, Master Preliminary 
Plat, Specific Plan or Development Agreement, prior to obtaining issuance of a Building Permit." 
•Section 6.14(a)(1) states, "The Director may authorize Building Permits for non-residential and 
multi-family dwellings provided that a Final Site Plan has been approved by the County and 
Construction Plans have been released by the County Engineer." 
•Section 4.6(c) indicates that a Preliminary Site Plan approval is required in order to obtain a 
Final Site Plan approval. 
The Snyderville Basin Development Code Administrative Guidelines outlines the procedure for 
receiving Final Site Plan approval. This procedure includes a review, public hearing and 
recommendation on a Preliminary Site Plan from the Planning Commission, a review, public 
hearing and decision from the Board of County Commissioners on a Preliminary Site Plan, and 
then, based on the preliminary approval, a Final Site Plan approval from the Board of County 
Commissioners. See Section 7 attached. 
This procedure has been followed on all projects in the Snyderville Basin since 1993. All new 
development has been required to submit a Site Plan for review and approval from the Planning 
Commission and Board of County Commissioners, whether the proposed use is a permitted use 
or a conditional use. Neither the Code nor Administrative Guidelines contemplate a separate or 
distinct review process for permitted and conditional uses; they are reviewed under the same 
process, with conditional uses requiring some additional findings only. 
Recommendation 
Staff would recommend, based on the Code sections above, that the Board makes a decision to 
uphold the Director's decision in denying the issuance of Building Permits for the Red Bam 
Development project until the project is reviewed and approved under the Site Plan approval 
process as outlined in the Administrative Guidelines. Without this Site Plan review, 
developments could potentially be constructed with no regard to site layout, buffering, setbacks, 
environmental constraints, adequacy of infrastructure, etc. The Site Plan review and approval 
ensures that all new development complies with Code standards and requirements and the project 
does not become a determent to the community. 
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40. Development Agreement - an agreement between the developer and the County pursuant 
to Section 4.11 herein. 
41. Development of County Impact or DCI - a proposed development which, because of the 
nature of its proposed use, size, or other considerations, as defined in Appendix A, will impact 
the entire Snyderville Basin and which therefore requires special review. 
42. Development Order - any action granting, denying, or granting with conditions, an 
application for a development permit. 
43. Development Permit - any building permit; conditional use permit; preliminary 
subdivision plat; final subdivision plat or other plat approval; preliminary site plan; final site 
plan; rezoning; or any other official action of the County or any other state or local government 
commission, board, agency, department or official having the effect of permitting the 
development of land located within the geographic area subject to the provisions of this Code. 
Directional Sign - A sign which serves as a directional guide through or to areas, events, 
buildings or structures and contain no advertising copy and is less than six square feet in area 
and not over four feet in height. 
44. Director - the Director of the Summit County Department of Community Development 
or tesauthorized designee. 
Dwelling Unit - One or more persons occupying a premise and living as a single housekeeping 
unit as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house or hotel as herein 
defined.a building occupied by one (1) or more persons living as a single housekeeping unit as 
distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house or hotel as herein 
defined. 
Dwelling. Multi-family - A building or portion thereof designed for occupancy bv three (3^ or 
more families in separate dwelling units. 
Dwelling. Single-Family - A building designed for occupancy by one (1) family, including 
manufactured or modular homes in conformance with the provisions of this Code. 
Dwelling. Single-Family Detached - A Single-Family Dwelling consisting of a single detached 
building containing one dwelling unit located on a lot containing no other dwelling units. 
Dwelling. Two-Family - A building designed for occupancy by two (2) families in separate 
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48. Final Site Plan - the map of a proposed development to be filed after approval by the 
BCC and any accompanying material as described in this Code. 
49. Final Subdivision Plat - The map of a subdivision to be recorded after approval by the 
BCC and any accompanying material as described in this Code. 
Financial Institution - An establishment engaged in the business of lending money and/or 
guaranteeing loans. 
Financial Services - An establishment primarily engaged in the provision of financial and 
banking services. Typical uses include banks, savings and loan institutions, stock and bond 
brokers loan and lending activities. 
Flood or Flooding - A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of 
normally dry land areas from: 
1. The overflow of waters: or 
2. The unusual and rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any 
source. 
50. Floor Area - the sum of the gross horizontal areas of the several stories of the building 
measured from the exterior faces of the exterior walls or from the center line of party walls. 
Included shall be any basement floor, interior balconies and mezzanines, elevator shafts,, aftd-
stair wells and enclosed porches. The floor area of accessory uses and of accessory buildings 
on the same lot shall be included. 
51. Floor area ratio - the ratio of the total floor area of all stories of all buildings on a site 
to the total lot area. 
Food Processing - An establishment in which foods, grains, or raw materials are processed or 
otherwise prepared for human consumption, including dairy manufacturing, canning and 
preserving foods, grain milling, bakery products and beverage manufacturing. 
Foot-candle - The illumination shed by one (1) candle on one (I) square foot at a distance of one 
m foot. 
Fraternal Organization - A group of people formally organized for a common interest, usually 
cultural, religious, or entertainment, with regular meetings, rituals, and formal written 
membership requirements. 
DRAFT: FOR DISCUSSION ONLY 26 
0 hi.' o 
underline - addition 
•trik •through - deletion 
ffi#^nm<fcffftW-PCiddiQon 
&nm*vW*#*k - PC deletion 
images. Signs do not include the flag or emblem of any nation, organization of nations, or state 
OR merchandise and pictures or models of projects or services incorporated in a window 
display, point of purchase advertising displays—such as product dispensers or drive up menu 
boards, legal notices required by law, (such as collection containers for charity, self help 
programs, and phone booths), lettering painted on or magnetically flush mounted on a motor 
vehicle operating in the normal course of business, works of art which in no way identify a 
product, or scoreboards located on athletic fields.—Definitions of particular functional, 
locational, and structural types of signs may be found in Table 1, 
98. Site Plan - a development plan of one or more lots on which is shown (1) the existing 
and proposed conditions of the lot, including but not limited to topography, vegetation, drainage, 
flood plains, wetlands and waterways; (2) the location of all existing and proposed buildings, 
drives, parking spaces, walkways, means or ingress and egress, drainage facilities, utility 
services, landscaping, structures,, and-signs, lighting? ancLscreening devices; (3) the location of 
building pads for all residential and non-residential buildings; and (4) andthe location and extent 
of all external buffers from surrounding areas. 
99. Sketch Plan - a sketch preparatory to the preliminary plat or site plan (or final plat or site 
plan in the case of minor subdivisions or conditional use permits) to enable the subdividcr to 
save time and expense in reaching general agreement with the BCC as to the form of the plat 
and the objectives of the Code. 
Ski area - All ski slopes or trails and other places under the control of a ski area operator and 
administered as a single enterprise. 
Ski Slopes or Trails - Areas designated to be used for the purpose of skiing or for the purpose 
of sliding downhill on snow or ice on skis, a toboggan, a sled, a tubef a ski-bob, or any other 
device. Such designation shall be set forth on trail maps provided with an application for 
development approval and designated by signs indicating same to the skiing public. 
Special Event - A nonrepeating occurrence having a duration of no longer than one (1^ thirty 
OOVday period specifically called to commemorate, initiate, finalize, advertise, or otherwise 
recognize a nonroutine happening. Examples of special events include- grand openings: going 
out of business sales: sporting events, concerts, fairs, or any public, charitable, educational or 
religious event or function. 
100. Specific Plan - a document encompassing a specific geographic area of the County which 
is prepared for the purpose of specifically implementing the General Plan by (1) refining the 
policies of the General Plan to a specific geographic area; and (2) containing specific 
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the Summit County Recorder or set forth herein shall govern. 
(d) Limitation on Uses. Fcrmitted-^Uses shall be limited to those aaes 
identified in the Schedule of perflritte^ Uses as a Permitted Use or Conditional 
Use. In addition to those uses expressly prohibited within a zoning district, any 
use category not expressly permitted Qfrffinditioftal shall be deemed prohibited 
unless the applicant: 
(1) Obtains a ruling from the BCC in accordance with the procedures 
set forth in Section 3.3(b) of this Code, that the proposed use is 
substantially similar to other |%HHfteel Uses listed in the Schedule of 
Permitted Uses for the applicable zoning district; or 
(2) Obtains an amendment to the Snyderville Basin General Plan and 
this Code in accordance with the procedures and standards set forth in 
Section 4,4 of this Code: or 
(3) If the use is listed as non-designated, obtains aft tf^glffiligff 
approval for such pursuant to the Designated Development Procedures set 
forth in Section 3.8 herein. 
3.6 Schedule of Pqrff*;tfaffi Uses and Bulk Regulations by Zoning District. 
(a) Schedule of jterfg&feai Uses. The Schedule of j^ efffl&ed Uses 
("Schedule") prescribes the allowable uses within each zoning district. The 
purpose of the Schedule of Pennitted Uses is to implement the Land use policies 
of the General Plan. Land Use Element. The Permitted Uses. Conditional Uses. 
Non-designated Uses, and Prohibited Uses within each zoning district shall be as 
prescribed in the Schedule. The Schedule lists zoning district on the horizontal 
axis and uses cla3aij5(^6fti on the vertical axis. The intersection of the vertical 
and horizontal axes is referred to herein as a "cell". The following rules shall be 
used to interpret the Schedule of jPMfifote^  Uses : 
(1) If the Symbol WP" appears in the cell, the use is permitted subject 
to the general requirements for specified uses within the zoning distnct. 
this Chapter, and the applicable performance standards set forth in 
Chapter 5 of this Code. No permitted use shall be established until all 
required permits are obtained including, at a minimum, a fottldtftg 
fel^M* permit. 
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accordance with Section 4.6 or a final subdivision plat has been approved 
in accordance with Section 4.7, and (3) a building permit has been issued 
by the Building Official. 
(3) For developments of county impact or phased development 
applications, a specific plan or master preliminary plan shall be approved 
in accordance with the procedures of Sections 4.9 and 4.10. 
4.6 Site Plan. 
(a) Applicability. The following applications shall be required to obtain site 
plan approval prior to filing an application for a building permit: 
(1) Requests for zoning map amendments to mixed use, commercial, 
or industrial zoning districts; and 
(2) Requests for conditional use approval. 
(b) Approval Procedure. No site plan shall become effective, nor shall 
compliance with the provisions of this Code be determined, until a final site plan 
has been approved by the BCC. 
(c) Effect of Site Plan Approval. 
(1) Preliminary Site Plan. 
[a] A preliminary site plan shall not authorize the development 
of land. After a preliminary site plan has been approved by the 
BCC, the applicant may file a final site plan. 
[b] Effective Period of Preliminary Site Plan Approval. The 
approval of a preliminary site plan shall be effective for a period 
of one (1) year from the date ofthat the preliminary site plan is 
approved by the BCC approval, at the end of which time the 
applicant must have submitted a final site plan for approval. If a 
final site plan is not submitted for final approval within the one (1) 
year period, the preliminary approval shall be null and void, and 
the applicant shall be required to submit a new plan for sketch plan 
review subject to the then existing zoning restrictions and 
subdivision regulations provisions of this Code and the General 
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Plan. 
(2) Final Site Plan. 
[a] After a final site plan has been approved by the BCC and 
filed in the Office of the Summit County GterkRecorder. and no 
subdivision plat is required and no final subdivision plat 
application is pending, the applicant may apply for building 
permits consistent with the proposed site plan. No building permit 
application may be filed with the Building Official until the 
Director has certified that such application conforms to the 
approved site plan. 
£b] The approval of a final site plan shall be effective for a 
period of one (1) year from the date that the final site plan is 
approved by the BCC. at the end of which time substantial 
construction shall have commenced and shall continue without 
interruption, as provided in Section 4.2(T)(3) of this Chapter fly ft 
frijiffttg pern*}? 3ppfo#ffcft fta$ ,fo%ft ..gpfrffftM a**4 n tefog 
revjfiWl ,fry ,,&£„ Etoftffr If substantial construction has not 
commenced within the one (I) year period, the final approval shall 
be null and void, and the applicant shall be required to submit a 
new preliminary site plan for sketch plan review subject to the then 
existing provisions of this Code and General Plan. 
4.7 Subdivision Review. 
(a) Applicability. No subdivision may be filed or recorded in the office of the 
County Recorder, and no lots shall be sold within a subdivision, until a 
subdivision plat has been approved by the BCC. 
(b) Approval Procedure. 
(1) Generally. No subdivision plat may be approved until a 
recommendation has been received by the Commission and the BCC has 
rendered its decision approving or approving with conditions the 
application for subdivision approval. Applications for subdivision 
approval shall apply for and secure approval in accordance with the 
following procedures. 
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judicial or other discretionary power, including rezoning or the adoption of any 
rule or regulation that would affect the proposed subdivision, shall be limited to 
a period of five (5) years. The covenant shall also contain a proviso that the 
County may, without incurring any liability, engage in action that otherwise 
would constitute a breach of the covenant if it makes a determination on the 
record that the action is necessary to avoid a substantial risk of injury to public 
health, safety and general welfare. The covenant shall contain the additional 
proviso that the County may, without incurring any liability, engage in action that 
otherwise would constitute a breach of the covenant if the action is required by 
federal or state law. 
(e) Third Party Rights. Except as otherwise expressly provided in the 
Development Agreement, the Development Agreement shall create no rights 
enforceable by any party who/which is not a party to the Development 
Agreement. 
4.12 Building Permits. 
(a) Applicability. No development shall occur except pursuant to a validly 
issued, unexpired and unrevoked building permit. 
(b) Building permit required. Any applicant for a building permit shall submit 
an approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a conditional 
use permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or development agreement prior 
to theobtaining issuance of a building permit. The permittee shall proceed only 
in accordance with the approved development permit and any approved 
conditions, and shall agree by recorded document to convey no portion of the 
parcel without first obtaining final approval in accordance with the provisions of 
theis Code. 
4.13 Certificates of Occupancy. 
(a) Applicability. A certificate of occupancy shall be required before any 
structure or premises, or part thereof, hereafter erected, changed, converted, 
moved, altered or enlarged wholly or in part, may be used or occupied. No 
certificate of occupancy shall be issued permitting the use or occupation of any 
such structure or premises unless: 
(1) If a building permit was required, the plans and application 
approvcdconstruction pursuant to such permit as reflected in the approved 
building have been fully completed and accomplished; or 
(2) If no building permit was required, the use conforms to this Code 
and all other applicable statutes, ordinances and regulations, or the use is 
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materials, and other information required by the BCC or County 
Engineer. The as-builts shall also include a complete set of drawings of 
the paving, drainage, water, sanitary sewer, or other public 
improvements, showing that the layout of the line and grade of all public 
improvements is in accordance with construction plans for the plat or site 
plan. Each as-built sheet shall show all changes made in the plans during 
construction and on each sheet there will be an as-built stamp bearing the 
signature of the County Engineer, and date, 
(c) The applicant's engineer shall provide to the County two reproducible 
drawings afld ft.CAP drawing, fife cqinpafrfrfe jo fo$ CoiKjty^ CAft 
system, of each of the utility plan sheets containing the as-built 
information. When such requirements have been met, and verified by the 
County Engineer and Director, the County, shall thereafter accept the 
public improvements for dedication in accordance with the established 
procedure as set forth in Section 6.12 hereto. Acceptance of the 
development shall mean that the developer has transferred all rights to all 
the public improvements to the County for use and maintenance. The 
BCC may, at their discretion, accept dedication of a portion of the 
required public improvements, provided adequate surety has been given 
for the completion of all of the required public improvements. 
6.14 Issuance of Building Permits and Certificates of Occupancy 
la) g^JM^.lSKmaS ITOiKMffl Section 5,17(d) of this Code, no building 
permit shall be issued for a lot or building site unless all public 
improvements as required for any applicable subdivision plat or site plan 
have bqen completed, py affi P<Wt Qf ffl .iWPygTftgftf agfiftmfflt 3S P3E 
S f f i 8 t l l M l M l l t t l l M » ftS Attested to by the Director and County 
Engineer and all applicable service providers. 
(1) The Director may authorize building permits for non-residential 
and multi-family dwellings provided that a final site plan has been 
approved by the County and construction plans have been released 
by the County Engineer. 
(2) The Director may authorize the Building Official to issue 
residential building permits for a portion of a subdivision provided 
all public improvements have been completed and accepted by the 
County Engineer, for that portion of the development, including 
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screening for the entire project from adjacent properties and 
inconsistent land uses; proposed methods for the mitigation of the 
impact of the development on public facilities and services; and 
proposed access and financial arrangements to ensure the construction 
of on-site infrastructure. 
6.2 Major Applications. At least fourteen (14) working days prior to filing a 
sketch plan for a major application with the Director, the Director may 
require the applicant to notify all affected persons and organizations that a 
sketch plan will be filed for the subject property and to make a presentation to 
such group or persons if the latter make a request to the Director to arrange 
such a meeting. Any such notice shall include a brief description of the 
proposed development and shall contain a statement that the sketch plan will be 
available at the offices of the Department of Community Development for 
public inspection. Alt aggrieved persons shall be entitled to submit written 
comments pertaining to the sketch plan. 
6.3 The Director or the Applicant may appeal a dispute as to the procedure for 
approval or the applicability of any standard set forth in Chapter 5 of the Code 
to the BCC in accordance with Section 4.6 herein. 
7 . PROCESSING APPLICATIONS FOR SITE PLAN OR SUBDIVISION PLAT 
APPROVAL 
7.1 Submission. An application for site plan or subdivision approval shall be 
submitted to the Director. If a proposed development is required to obtain both 
subdivision and site plan review, the applications for subdivision and site plan 
review, in the exercise of the Director's discretion, may be processed 
concurrently. 
7.2 Preliminary Site Plan or Subdivision Applications. 
7.2.1 Applicants shall not apply for preliminary site plan or subdivision 
approval until the Director or BCC has reviewed any sketch plan 
required for the proposed development at a preapplication conference. 
7.2.2 After the completion of a report and-recommendation to the 
Commission, the Director shall schedule a hearing on the application 
before the Commission. The Commission shall conduct the hearing and 
submit its recommendation of the BCC. Within five (5) days after the 
recommendation of the Commission has been rendered, the Director 
should place the application and recommendation of the Commission on 
the next available regular agenda of the BCC. After receiving the 
recommendation of the Commission, the BCC shall consider the 
application at a public hearing and shall render its decision to approve, 
deny or conditionally approve the application. One (1) copy of the 
preliminary site plan and subdivision plat shall be returned to the 
12 
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applicant with the date of approval, conditional approval, or 
disapproval and the reasons therefore accompanying the application. 
7.3 Final major permit. 
7.3.1 Following the approval of the preliminary site plan or subdivision plat 
the applicant shall file with the Director an application for final 
approval. The application for a final site plan or subdivision plat shall 
conform to the approved preliminary site plan or subdivision plat and 
any conditions attached thereto. 
7.3.2 The Director shall submit the final application, any proposed revisions 
or amendments submitted thereto by the applicant responding to the 
conditions attached to the preliminary application, and any report to 
the BCC. The application may be placed on the consent agenda of the 
BCC. After the BCC has reviewed the application, the report of the 
Director, any recommendations and testimony and exhibits submitted 
at the public hearing, the applicant may be advised of any required 
changes and/or adaitions. The BCC should approve, approve with 
conditions, or disapprove the final application, and one (1) copy of the 
proposed final site plan or subdivision plat should be returned to the 
developer with the date of approval, conditional approval, or 
disapproval and the reasons therefore accompanying the application. 
7.3.3 The Director may notify the applicant if the final application is not 
consistent with the preliminary application. If the final application 
for any phase of a preliminary application is not consistent with the 
preliminary application the applicant may: 
7.3.3.1 refile the final application in a form which is in 
substantial compliance with the preliminary 
application; or 
7.3.3.2 obtain an approval of such substantial deviation by: (1) 
applying for an amendment to the preliminary site plan 
or subdivision plat, in which case the procedure for 
amendment of the preliminary site plan or subdivision 
plat shall be the same as for approval thereof, (2) in the 
case of a phased major permit application, amending the 
master preliminary plan, and in the case of a 
development of county impact, amending the Specific 
Plan; or 
7.3.3.3 appeal the Director's determination to the BCC. 
7.3.4 Submission and Review. Subsequent to the resolution of the BCC, at 
least three (3) paper copies of the construction plans, and one (1) 
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copy of the original of. the application on tracing cloth, and/or 
reproduction mylar, and two (2) copies of the application on sepia 
paper and at applicant's cost two (2) copies of the application on paper 
shall be submitted to the Director for final review. The BCC may 
withhold final approval until a review has indicated that all 
requirements of the Code and these guidelines have been met. 
7 .3 .5 Signing and Recordation of Final Site Plan or Subdivision Plat. 
7.3.5.1 Improvements. 
7.3.5.1.1 When an improvement agreement and security are 
required, the Chairman of the BCC may endorse 
approval on the final application after the agreement 
and security* have been approved by the BCC and all 
the conditions of the resolution pertaining to the 
final application have been satisfied. 
7.3.5.1.2 When installation of improvements is required prior 
to recordation of the final application, the Chairman 
of the BCC may endorse approval on the final 
application after all conditions of the resolution have 
been satisfied and all improvements satisfactorily 
completed. There should be written evidence that the 
required public facilities have been installed in a 
manner satisfactory to the County has shown by a 
certificate signed by the County Engineer and County 
Attorney stating that the necessary dedication of 
public lands and improvements has been 
accomplished. 
CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS 
8.1 No conditional use shall be authorized, developed or otherwise carried out 
until the applicant has secured a final site plan approved by the BCC. 
8.2 Review of conditional uses may occur concurrent with site plan review. After 
undertaking such review, the Commission and the BCC may approve the 
conditional use as submitted, approve the conditional use with such reasonable 
conditions as it may deem necessary to protect the character of the existing 
neighborhood and ensure the quality of the proposed development, or deny the 
proposed conditional use for reasons specified in writing and communicated to 
the applicant. If the proposed conditional use is approved or approved with 
conditions, such approval should be communicated to the Director in writing 
and any required conditions should be incorporated into the permit. 
MASTER PRELIMINARY PLANS 
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shall be subject to change by reason of any compelling, 
countervailing public interest or to changes in state or federal 
law. 
1 2 . BUILDING PERMITS 
12.1 Submission. An application for a building permit shall be submitted to the 
Director on the form provided by the County and shall be accompanied by the 
required processing fee. The application shall be accompanied by such 
documents, plans, maps or other information as the building inspector may 
request, including but not limited to evidence that all requested development 
permits have been finally approved by the appropriate decision maker and that 
all conditions imposed at the time of such approval have been satisfied. Upon 
receipt of an application for a building permit, the building inspector shall 
examine the application and ascertain ascertain the exact location of the 
property on which the development will occur. The building official shall 
obtain a written statement of the street address of the property or, if no street 
address exists, a property description in writing, before issuing a building 
permit. 
12.2 Approval Procedure 
12.2.1 Development permit required. Any applicant for a building 
permit shall submit a minor permit or an approved final site 
plan, final subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a conditional use 
permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or development 
agreement prior to the issuance of a building permit. The 
permittee shall proceed only in accordance with the approved 
development permit permit and any approved conditions, and 
shall agree by recorded document to convey no portion of the 
parcel without first obtaining final approval in accordance with 
the provisions of the Code. 
12.2.2 Posting of building permit. A copy of the building permit shall 
be posted in a conspicuous place on the premises, out of the 
weather, and visible throughout the construction period until 
completion of all work authorized by the building permit. 
12.3 Expiration and extension of building permit. 
12.3.1 A building permit shall automatically expire and become null 
and void if work authorized by such permit is not substantially 
commenced within six (6) months from the effective date of the 
permit, or if such work, when commenced, is suspended or 
abandoned an any time for a period of six (6) months. 
12.3.2 Notwithstanding the provision of Section 12.3.1, if the work 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RED BARN DEVELOPMENT, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO 
DATE: 
JUDGE: 
970300092PR 
28 OCT 1997 
PAT" B BRIAN 
This matter came before the Court on a hearing for Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment held October 27, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B Brian, District Court Judge. 
Plaintiff Red Barn Development and Defendant Summit County were present and presented 
argument in favor of, and in opposition to their respective Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Having heard argument, and reviewed and considered the memoranda in support or and in 
opposition to the Motions, the Court hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 On March 21 , 1997, Plaintiff submitted a Final Site Plan application to the 
Summit Count v Department of Community Development This application did not contain a 
preliminary Site Plan, nor was a preliminary Site Plan ever reviewed by the Board of County 
1 
Commissioners or the Planning Commission 
2 On April 15, 1997 Summit County denied the issuance of a Building Permit 
to Red Barn, stating that the approval of commercial projects requires preliminary and final site 
plan approval by the County Board of Commissioners and the Planning Commission 
3 On May 22, 1997 and June 19, 1997, the Summit County Board of 
Adjustment heard and weighed evidence, and decided to uphold the denial of a Building Permit to 
Red Barn Developments 
4 Plaintiff Red Barn sought this Court's review of the Board of Adjustment 
decision, and this Court heard argument on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
5 On or about October 17, 1997, this Court entered an Order holding that, 
while its review would be limited to the record of the hearing before the County Board of 
Adjustments, the Court would review the Board of Adjustment's decision de novo, giving no 
deference to the conclusions of law reached by the Board of Adjustments This Court held an 
additional hearing on October 27, 1997 to further consider the Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court may grant a Motion for Summary Judgment when there exists no 
genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
At the hearing held October 27, 1997, both parties stipulated that there exists no genuine issues o( 
matenal fact, and this Court should entei judgment as a mattei of law 
2. The law controlling the case at hand is the Synderville Basin Development 
Code (the "Code.1') 
3 Plaintiff properly seeks a permitted use building permit, and not a conditional 
use building permit The Code clearly distinguishes between a permitted use building permit and a 
conditional use building permit. However, this Court is not convinced that the Code clearly sets 
forth all the requirements for obtaining a permitted use building permit. 
4. A reading of sections 3 6 and 3 7 of the Code indicate that while a final site 
plan approval is required to obtain a conditional use building peunit, the Code makes no such 
requirement for obtaining a permitted use building permit. 
5. Defendant's assertion the other elements of the Code taken together, or in the 
alternative, that the intent of the Code gives rise to a requiring a final site plan for a permitted use 
building permit is unsupported by the plain language of the Code 
6. Consequently, this Court holds that Plaintiff need not submit a final Site Plan 
for the County's review and has complied with the Code's requirements set forth to obtain a 
permitted use building permit. 
7. However, granting building permits, an exercise of the zoning and police 
powers, is a discretionary' legislative function of local government Consequently, the doctrines o( 
separation of powers renders this Court unable to grant the relief Plaintiff seeks This Court can 
hold that Plaintiffs have complied with the Code's requirements for a permitted use building 
permit, and note that should the County refuse to issue a building permit due to capricious and 
ai bin ai > grounds, Plaintiff might then propeily seek relief in this Court 
3 u I 
ORDER 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, 
Plaintiffs relief prayed for is DENIED Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED 
DATED this $$ day of
 4 V C.//Q /.-' J-^1997 
BY THE COURT 
? 
• > ^ ^ / / . - / - _ . 
PATB BRIAN, JODCiT^" 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RED BARN DEVELOPMENT, L C , a Utah 
limited liability company 
Plaintiff, 
V 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant 
ORDER 
CASH NO 
DATE 
JUDGE 
970300092PR 
17 OCT 1997 
PA! B BRIAN 
I'his matter came befoie the (Joint on a heating foi plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment At the hearing, the Court inquired as to its proper standard of leview, and whether 
this Court should give any deference to the Board of Adjustment's conclusions or review the 
conclusions ilc novo Having heard argument from counsel for plaintiff and defendant, and having 
received and considered plaintiffs Motion, togcthei with memoranda in suppoit of and opposition 
to the Motion, the Court hereby makes the following Order 
V'V £'/?«-/ 
ORDER 
This Court will review the Board of Adjustment's consclusions dc novo, and the panics 
are instructed to proceed with their case as they see fit 
DATliD thisO^V day of f^/fa T rt t x ' ^ ^ l 
BY Till: COURT 
1
 - 1 / < I » I 'I/, 
PAT 
DIST 
B BRIAN, JUDGE \f^W ''^: 
RIC'I COURT JUDGE \ f e # s0iht %c 
'*,. fr> 
V ' ? ui 
''''"''iii ^ 
VV 5Vc 
CKRTIFICATK OF SER VI £K 
(A /X -4-
I hereby certify that on this -£f\ day of (_)C. 7", _ ., '997, I caused to be mailed, first 
class postage prepaid, a true copy of the foregoing ORDER to 
DENNIS K POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
4541 SOUTH 700 EAST SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
ROBERT W ADKINS 
DAVID L THOMAS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUMMIT COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
PO BOX 128 
COALVILLE. UT 84107 
DATED this^K-/ day of Q(!_t- ,1997 
Clerk 
ADDENDUM D 
(RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) 
l5o UTAH HLLLS (JH UVIL KKUtMR-nr , i V U l C xj\> 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955) 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on tha t 
date, but due to fact tha t there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such . udg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgrient. 
Backr.er v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124, 288 P 2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Hank 
& Trust Co v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
Cited m Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (H65), 
J P W . Enters.. Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Opemng default or default judgment cla.med 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
rviRtakt. es to time or place of appear i n o 
rr:aj. or Tiling of n^ressary papers. 21 A L R 3d 
" 2' " 
FiiJure to give notice of application for at 
thdh judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.LR.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appehjr at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United Si-ates 
under Rule 55<e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A L.R Fed. 190 
Key N u m b e r s . — Judgment «= 92 to 134 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required fcr 
T
- Personam Default Judgment m Utah Gra-
>am v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L Rev 9:-<7 
Am. Jur. 2d. —47 Am. Jur . 2d Judgm^r'^s 
* 265 et eeq 
C.J-S. — 49 C J.S. Judgments §§ 187 vo 218 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof aa to La-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A L R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
rearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending pa r ty . A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment ir his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and p roceed ings the reon . The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavit?. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutoiy in 
character, may be rendered on the issue ofliabihty alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully ad jud ica ted on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked end a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, sh ill if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and m good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
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stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
- Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Contract interpretation. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
—Notice. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
•—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest 
— Findings bv court 
